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CLEANING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
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Although empirical scholarship dominates the field of law and finance, much of
it shares a common vulnerability: an abiding faith in the accuracy and integrity of a
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small, specialized collection of corporate governance data. In this Article, we unveil
a novel collection of three decades’ worth of corporate charters for thousands of public
companies, which shows that this faith is misplaced.
We make three principal contributions to the literature. First, we label our corpus
for a variety of firm- and state-level governance features. Doing so reveals significant
infirmities within the most well-known corporate governance datasets, including an
error rate exceeding eighty percent in the G-Index, the most widely used proxy for
“good governance” in law and finance. Correcting these errors substantially weakens
one of the most well-known results in law and finance, which associates good
governance with higher investment returns. Second, we make our corpus freely
available to others, in hope of providing a long-overdue resource for traditional
scholars as well as those exploring new frontiers in corporate governance, ranging
from machine learning to stakeholder governance to the eﬀects of common ownership.
Third, and more broadly, our analysis exposes twin cautionary tales about the critical
role of lawyers in empirical research, and the dubious practice of throttling public
access to public records.
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INTRODUCTION
Corporate governance lapses are blamed for some of the most
ignominious business catastrophes in recent history, from Enron’s epic
collapse,1 to Wells Fargo’s $3 billion ﬁne,2 to the implosions of WeWork3 and
Theranos.4 And in the wake of each debacle, legions of empirically minded
researchers soon followed,5 marshaling mountains of quantitative data to
unpack lessons about where governance failed and how it can be improved.6
Their collective eﬀorts have met with a ravenous reception: empirical
corporate governance research now dominates the law and ﬁnance landscape,7

1 See Woodrow W. Clark & Istemi Demirag, Enron: The Failure of Corporate Governance, J.
CORP. CITIZENSHIP, Winter 2002, at 105, 105 (“[T]he company both instructed and led its
accounting ﬁrm into ‘dubious’ ﬁnancial transactions, which ultimately caused the collapse of Enron
and may have ended Andersen as an independent ﬁrm . . . .”).
2 Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Wells Fargo Agrees to Pay $3 Billion to Resolve Criminal &
Civil Investigations into Sales Practices Involving the Opening of Millions of Accounts Without
Customer Authorization (Feb. 21, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/wells-fargo-agrees-pay-3billion-resolve-criminal-and-civil-investigations-sales-practices [https://perma.cc/84AX-G9F6]
(describing how employees created fraudulent customer accounts in order to meet unrealistic sales
goals set by the company).
3 Michael Peregrine, WeWork and the Value of Effective Governance, FORBES (Sept. 17, 2019,
7:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelperegrine/2019/09/17/wework-and-the-value-ofeffective-governance [https://perma.cc/6QNU-ATQ9] (describing how WeWork lacked traditional
corporate governance protections, including basic internal controls).
4 Pamela Wasley, The Theranos Crisis: Where Was the Board?, FORBES (Apr. 27, 2016, 3:57 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/groupthink/2016/04/27/the-theranos-crisis-where-was-the-board
[https://perma.cc/7XKW-ERDH] (describing how Theranos’ board was not constructed in a way
that promotes eﬀective governance).
5 See generally Ofer Eldar, A Lawyer’s Guide To Empirical Corporate Governance, STANFORD J.L. BUS.
& FIN. (forthcoming 2022), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3865358 [https://perma.cc/6CEL-NEL9]
(describing and documenting the proliferation of empirical corporate governance research).
6 See generally Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity
Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107 (2003) (using empirical data to construct a governance index as a proxy for
level of shareholder rights); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert
W. Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) (examining the legal regimes in forty-nine
countries and explaining the correlated discrepancies in protections afforded to investors).
7 As of October 25, 2021, La Porta et al.’s interrelated article has been referenced 23,811 times
in academic journals, including over 839 citations in law review articles. As of October 25, 2021,
Gompers et al.’s article was cited 9,970 times, including over 215 law review articles. See infra Part I.
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routinely informing government policy,8 real-world practice,9 and vigorous
academic debate.10 By any reasonable accounting, the topic is a major success
story in the interdisciplinary study of law.
And yet a potentially fatal ﬂaw has long lurked just beneath this seemingly
resplendent facade: shallow data. Many of the preeminent contributions in
empirical corporate governance depend commonly (and critically) on a
surprisingly slender stockpile of datasets whose provenance is frustratingly
obscure. But virtually no one has seriously attempted to gauge the integrity
of these pivotal inputs.11
Until now. In this article, we unveil a new resource that allows
researchers—for the ﬁrst time—to investigate the ﬁdelity of foundational
corporate governance metrics. And the results aren’t pretty. We demonstrate
that several of the most heavily relied upon governance datasets suﬀer from
8 See, e.g., Good Faith Determinations of Fair Value, 86 Fed. Reg. 748, 795 (Jan. 6, 2021) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 270) (citing to empirical research on price discovery in a regulation
on accounting methods); Amendments to Financial Disclosures About Acquired and Disposed
Businesses, 85 Fed. Reg. 54,002, 54,043 n.442 (Aug. 31, 2020) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210,
230, 239, 240, 249, 270, 274) (citing to empirical research on the relative size of merging companies);
Form CRS Relationship Summary; Amendments to Form ADV; Required Disclosures in Retail
Communications and Restrictions on the Use of Certain Names or Titles, 83 Fed. Reg. 21,416,
21,442 nn.233-38, 21,485 nn.575-76 (proposed May 9, 2018) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240,
249, 275, 279) (relying on empirical research to support a regulation regarding financial advisor
compensation arrangements).
9 See, e.g., CREDIT SUISSE RSCH. INST., HOW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MATTERS 18
(2016), https://www.credit-suisse.com/media/assets/corporate/docs/about-us/research/publications/
how-corporate-governance-matters.pdf [https://perma.cc/NG8L-2QLC] (advertising an investment
strategy using the well-known “G-Index” as a factor for picking high-performing stocks).
10 See, e.g., Martijn Cremers & Allen Ferrell, Thirty Years of Shareholder Rights and Firm Value,
69 J. FIN. 1167 (2014) (discussed at greater length supra note 116); Amir N. Licht, Chanan
Goldschmidt & Shalom H. Schwartz, Culture, Law, and Corporate Governance, 25 INT’L REV. L. &
ECON. 229 (2005); William A. Reese Jr. & Michael S. Weisbach, Protection of Minority Shareholders
Interests, Cross-Listings in the United States, and Subsequent Equity Oﬀerings, 66 J. FIN. ECON. 65, 7879 (2002); Holger Spamann, The “Antidirector Rights Index” Revisited, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 467 (2010);
Miroslava Straska & H. Gregory Waller, Antitakeover Provisions and Shareholder Wealth: A Survey of
the Literature, 49 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 933 (2014).
11 Most researchers have by and large presumed the integrity of the data, focusing instead on
new ways to analyze, interpret, or critique its use. See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano,
Empirical Studies of Corporate Law, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, 945 (A. Mitchell
Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007); Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters
in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783 (2009) [hereinafter Bebchuk et al., What Matters];
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Charles C.Y. Wang, Learning and the Disappearing Association
Between Governance and Returns, 108 J. FIN. ECON. 323 (2013) [hereinafter Bebchuk et al.,
Disappearing Association]; Lawrence D. Brown & Marcus L. Caylor, Corporate Governance and Firm
Valuation, 25 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 409 (2006); John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & Tjomme O.
Rusticus, Does Weak Governance Cause Weak Stock Returns? An Examination of Firm Operating
Performance and Investors’ Expectations, 61 J. FIN. 655 (2006); Cremers & Ferrell, supra note 10;
Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1325 (2013);
Jonathan M. Karpoﬀ, Robert J. Schonlau & Eric W. Wehrly, Do Takeover Defense Indices Measure
Takeover Deterrence?, 30 REV. FIN. STUD. 2359 (2017).

2021]

Cleaning Corporate Governance

5

inaccuracies so extensive as to call into question some of the landmark
insights of the ﬁeld.
The resource we unveil is anchored by a ﬁrst-of-its-kind textual corpus
representing over a quarter-century’s worth of corporate charters for S&P
1500 listed issuers.12 We hand label13 a signiﬁcant subset of these full-text
documents for characteristics that feature prominently in the governance
literature. And, rectifying a longstanding deﬁcit in the ﬁeld, we make the
corpus publicly available as open source, in the hope that it will catalyze and
improve future research. Collectively, we refer to our raw corpus and labels
as the “Cleaning Corporate Governance” (CCG) database. The database
provides researchers with an unprecedented capability to analyze the
composition and structure of the very textual heart of corporate
governance—certificates of incorporation—across firms, industries, and
jurisdictions, and over time.
But it is substantially more than that. The CCG also allows researchers—
for the ﬁrst time—to reassess foundational insights from law and ﬁnance. We
use it, for example, to show that the ingredients of the most renowned
corporate governance index in the ﬁeld, the “G-Index,”14 are riddled with
inaccuracies, resulting in an estimated error rate exceeding 80%—a rate that
gets worse over time. And these inaccuracies are not simply garden-variety
statistical anomalies. Rather, we demonstrate that they unsettle even one of
the most famous results in the ﬁeld: that systematically investing in ﬁrms
with “good governance” delivers returns that signiﬁcantly eclipse the
market.15 When reanalyzed with corrected data, this result changes
appreciably. To the extent any part of it survives, it does so in a materially
attenuated form.

12 The S&P Composite 1500 Index is a broad-based stock index of U.S.-traded equities
designed to represent a broad-based market portfolio. It is the aggregation of the S&P 500, the S&P
MidCap 400, and the S&P SmallCap 600, covering approximately 90% of the market capitalization
of U.S. stocks. See PHILLIP BRZENK, HAMISH PRESTON & AYE SOE, S&P DOW JONES INDICES,
THE S&P COMPOSITE 1500: AN EFFICIENT MEASURE OF THE U.S. EQUITY MARKET 1, 3 (2020),
https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/documents/research/research-the-sp-composite-1500-aneﬃcient-measure-of-the-us-equity-market.pdf [https://perma.cc/S5CB-QDKG] (describing the
S&P Composite 1500 and examining its utility compared to alternative indices).
13 Labeling is a procedure whereby a third party (typically a natural person with relevant
expertise) evaluates, ranks, or categorizes the substantive content of documents in a corpus. See
Todd Kulesza, Saleema Amershi, Rich Caruana, Danyel Fisher & Denis Charles, Structured Labeling
to Facilitate Concept Evolution in Machine Learning (describing the process of labeling data to support
machine learning) in CHI ‘14: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIGCHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN
FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 3075, 3075 (2014).
14 See Gompers et al., supra note 6, at 109 (describing the construction of the “‘Governance
Index’ as a proxy for the balance of power between shareholders and managers”).
15 See id. at 123 tbl.VI.
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The value of the CCG is not limited to reassessing prior results in the
corporate governance literature, however. It also helps lay the foundation for
the next chapter of corporate governance research at a critical moment, when
we stand at the crossroads of several new and exciting directions the ﬁeld
might pursue. Machine learning and computational text analysis, for example,
are becoming increasingly prominent in many areas of legal scholarship16 but
have yet to gain a signiﬁcant foothold in corporate governance.17 The CCG is
16 See, e.g., Jens Frankenreiter & Michael A. Livermore, Computational Methods in Legal
Analysis, 16 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 39, 40 (2020) (“Techniques from the ﬁelds of artiﬁcial
intelligence, natural language processing, text mining, network analysis, and machine learning are
now routinely taken up by legal practitioners and law scholars.”); Kellen Funk & Lincoln A. Mullen,
The Spine of American Law: Digital Text Analysis and U.S. Legal Practice, 123 AM. HIST. REV. 132, 136
(2018) (arguing that combining computational text analysis with traditional historical research
practices can be productive for legal historians); Michael A. Livermore, Allen B. Riddell & Daniel
N. Rockmore, The Supreme Court and the Judicial Genre, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 837, 840 (2017) (using
quantitative methods to explore the writing styles of U.S. Supreme Court Justices); Jonathan Macey
& Joshua Mitts, Finding Order in the Morass: The Three Real Justifications for Piercing the Corporate Veil,
100 CORNELL L. REV. 99, 103 (2014) (using machine learning and automated text analysis to classify
9,380 cases on piercing the corporate veil); Marian Moszoro, Pablo T. Spiller & Sebastian Stolorz,
Rigidity of Public Contracts, 13 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 396, 396 (2016) (applying algorithmic
data reading and textual analysis to compare the features of contracts in regulated industries); Julian
Nyarko, Stickiness and Incomplete Contracts, 88 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 30 (2021) (performing an
algorithmic classiﬁcation of “material contracts” that public companies ﬁled with the Securities and
Exchange Commission between 2000 and 2016); David E. Pozen, Eric L. Talley & Julian Nyarko, A
Computational Analysis of Constitutional Polarization, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2019) (applying
machine learning methods to study the polarization of extrajudicial constitutional debate by
analyzing the language used in congressional ﬂoor speeches and published editorials); Eric L. Talley,
Is the Future of Law a Driverless Car?: Assessing How the Data-Analytics Revolution Will Transform Legal
Practice, 174 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 183, 184 (2018) (“Although quantitative
analysis of law (also called empirical legal studies) is nothing new, textual analysis methods have
become signiﬁcantly more powerful over the last half decade.”); Eric Talley & Drew O’Kane, The
Measure of a MAC: A Machine-Learning Protocol for Analyzing Force Majeure Clauses in M&A
Agreements, 168 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 181, 183 (2012) (proposing a method for
improving databases on Material Adverse Event clauses).
17 The literature applying machine learning to governance is still thin, and very little of it
focuses on foundational corporate governance documents themselves (due in part to the absence of
a corpus like the CCG). Cf. Adam B. Badawi, Scott D. Dyreng, Elisabeth de Fontenay & Robert W.
Hills, Contractual Complexity in Debt Agreements: The Case of EBITDA (Duke L. Sch. Pub. L. & Legal
Theory Series, Paper No. 2019-67), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3455497#
[https://perma.cc/99BV-HPCP] (using machine learning techniques to analyze EBITDA
deﬁnitions in credit agreements); Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric L. Talley, Contracting Out of the
Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 COLUM. L. REV.
1075, 1078 (2017) (building a targeted corpus of corporate opportunity waivers from public ﬁlings);
Elvis Hernandez-Perdomo, Yilmaz Guney & Claudio M. Rocco, A Reliability Model for Assessing
Corporate Governance Using Machine Learning Techniques, 185 RELIABILITY ENG’G & SYS. SAFETY
220, 222 (2019) (marshaling select ﬁnancial disclosure items related to corporate governance to assess
“systems failure” in ﬁrms); Ryan Bubb & Emiliano Catan, The Party Structure of Mutual Funds 1-2
(Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 560, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=
3124039 [https://perma.cc/N84H-SBBM] (using machine learning techniques to study mutual
fund voting patterns).

2021]

Cleaning Corporate Governance

7

ideal for these methodologies, and we deploy several of them here. In
particular, we use them to corroborate our error correction eﬀorts and to shed
light on a host of deeper governance questions—including whether legal
origins matter and how governance evolves during periods of disruption like
the Financial Crisis. The emergent scholarly literature on “common
ownership” can also beneﬁt from the CCG.18 While this literature raises
troubling questions about whether large passive investors are conduits for
anticompetitive behavior, its proponents still struggle to pin down the precise
mechanism through which passive ownership translates into conscious
parallelism.19 The CCG provides an intriguing tool for smoking out such a
mechanism (if one exists) by dusting for ﬁngerprints left at the scene of the
crime, as manifested in stockholder rights and governance structures in our
corpus. Similarly, the CCG can help reveal how governance shapes (and is
shaped by) the very purpose of the corporation itself, particularly as scholars
and policy makers take the concept of stakeholder governance more seriously.20
Preexisting governance metrics—which tend to focus exclusively on
shareholder interests—have little to say about this topic, but the CCG is a
ready resource for generating new measures that bear directly on nonshareholder constituencies.

18 See generally José Azar, Martin C. Schmalz & Isabel Tecu, Anticompetitive Eﬀects of Common
Ownership, 73 J. FIN. 1513 (2018) (discussing the potential anticompetitive eﬀects of common
ownership among publicly traded companies within an industry); Einer Elhauge, Horizontal
Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267, 1316 (2016) (concluding that horizontal shareholding can “help
explain fundamental economic puzzles” such as executive compensation, corporate expansion
strategy, and economic inequality); Eric A. Posner, Fiona M. Scott Morton & E. Glen Weyl, A
Proposal to Limit the Anticompetitive Power of Institutional Investors, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 669, 670, 701
(2017) (proposing a policy of limiting major institutional investors to owning a maximum one
percent stake in each ﬁrm within a given oligopolistic industry); Fiona Scott Morton & Herbert
Hovenkamp, Horizontal Shareholding and Antitrust Policy, 127 YALE L.J. 2026, 2034-35 (2018) (arguing
that although the mechanism by which common ownership leads to higher prices is unknown, a
precise understanding of the mechanism is unnecessary under the Clayton Act’s “eﬀects test”).
19 See C. Scott Hemphill & Marcel Kahan, The Strategies of Anticompetitive Common Ownership,
129 YALE L.J. 1392, 1398 (2020) (“Missing from the [common ownership] debate thus far has been a
systematic explication and assessment of the causal mechanisms that might link common ownership
to higher prices.”).
20 See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Opinion, Companies Shouldn’t Be Accountable Only to Shareholders,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 14, 2018, 7:01 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/companies-shouldnt-beaccountable-only-to-shareholders-1534287687 [https://perma.cc/C9RW-ADRQ] (proposing a bill
that would have the eﬀect of requiring “corporate directors to consider the interests of all major
corporate stakeholders—not only shareholders—in company decisions”); Robert J. Rhee, A Legal
Theory of Shareholder Primacy, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1951, 1953 (2018) (“Despite persistent criticism,
the idea of shareholder primacy has been widely accepted. However, its legal status remains
uncertain even today.”); Cathy Hwang & Yaron Nili, Shareholder-Driven Stakeholderism, U. CHI. L.
REV. ONLINE (Apr. 15, 2020), https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2020/04/15/shareholder-drivenstakeholderism-hwang-nili [https://perma.cc/G8VZ-6TV9] (arguing that shareholders, as opposed
to managers, have been the driving force behind improved stakeholder governance).
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More broadly, this Article exposes two systemic issues that should concern
empirical researchers of all stripes. The ﬁrst is that corporate governance
research has a critical need for lawyers and lawyerly judgment. We conjecture
that a principal reason that data errors have propagated for so long in this
ﬁeld is that lawyers were exiled (or relegated themselves) to the back seat of
the data aggregation project. In their absence, non-lawyers were left to do
much of the work, proceeding—as best they could—to dispense judgments
about the eﬀects of formal legal documents, statutes, case law, and the like.
While perhaps a commendable ﬁrst eﬀort, such casual empiricism no longer
suﬃces. Lawyers can and must play a more central role in empirical corporate
governance research, reclaiming the function for which they are
professionally trained.
Second, our enterprise underscores the seemingly banal observation that
data availability matters. A lot. Another likely reason for poor data quality in
this area is that corporate governance documents are surprisingly diﬃcult to
collect, organize, and analyze. Many notable jurisdictions (such as Delaware)
actively throttle public access to their rich documentary trove, tossing in
exorbitant access fees for good measure.21 Federal regulators (such as the
SEC) provide several governance documents for free, but only in highly
disorganized form.22 And the few private enterprises that have attempted to
organize them also protect their creations aggressively with paywalls, user
restrictions, and ominous litigation threats.23 Although the CCG partially
frees the next generation of corporate governance scholars from these
restraints, we nonetheless join with others (in law and elsewhere) in calling
for better and less restrictive public access to public documents.24
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I assesses the most
important empirical corporate governance studies to date, and the role of the
most critical datasets within them. We also observe that because of the
See infra notes 95–97 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 104–108 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Alaina Lancaster, ROSS Intelligence Accuses Thomson Reuters of Crushing Competitors
With ‘Sham Copyrights and Intimidation Tactics,’ LAW.COM: THE RECORDER (Jan. 25, 2021),
https://www.law.com/therecorder/2021/01/25/ross-intelligence-accuses-thomson-reuters-ofcrushing-competitors-with-sham-copyrights-and-intimidation-tactics [https://perma.cc/A2H4KNXW] (describing the legal resistance one startup encountered when trying to create an
alternative to Westlaw).
24 See Julie Sobowale, The Battle to Free Legal Information, NAT’L MAG. (Feb. 4, 2021),
https://www.nationalmagazine.ca/en-ca/articles/legal-market/legal-tech/2021/the-battle-for-legalinformation [https://perma.cc/B85N-QA2Y] (describing how, despite their company’s failure, two
entrepreneurs remain committed to making the law more accessible); Adam R. Pah, David L.
Schwartz, Sarath Sanga, Zachary D. Clopton, Peter DiCola, Rachel Davis Mersey, Charlotte S.
Alexander, Kristian J. Hammond & Luís A. Nunes Amaral, How to Build a More Open Justice System,
369 SCIENCE 134 (2020) (chronicling restrictions of the PACER system over federal judicial records).
Use of our corpus is free to all, governed by a Creative Commons license. See infra note 211.
21
22
23
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prohibitive challenges in obtaining underlying textual data, most researchers
have relied on commercial third-party sources. Part II describes our research
design and data collection protocols, providing a descriptive snapshot of the
size, reach, and scope of the CCG. We then demonstrate that corporate
charters are highly dynamic documents, amended with increasing
frequency.25 Yet they have also progressively become more “lawyered,”
growing longer, more technical, and less readable than their forebears of a
quarter century ago. More provocatively, this Part uses the CCG to document
the alarming inaccuracy of prominent corporate governance indices, showing
that even one of best-known results in the ﬁeld attenuates considerably in the
presence of cleaned data. Part III explores important future uses of the CCG,
including its ability to generate novel insights about the state and evolution
of corporate charters. Among other things, we illustrate how the database
lends itself to a wide variety of emergent computational and machine learning
techniques, spotlighting several applications. Part IV discusses the broader
implications of our study, situating it within the larger enterprise of empirical
legal studies. A ﬁnal section concludes.26
I. THE STATE OF PLAY IN EMPIRICAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
RESEARCH
This article puts forward, for the ﬁrst time, a clean, open-source,
researchable corpus of corporate charters—the documentary DNA of
corporate governance. But before proceeding to describe the CCG database
itself, it is important to underscore why this data resource is so important.
While there are many moving parts, two forces predominate: supply and
demand. We discuss each below, followed by a discussion of the practical
constraints that face researchers who endeavor to collect raw corporate
governance documents.

25 This contrasts with the usual perception that certiﬁcates of incorporation are relatively slow
to change. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 833, 844 (2005) (implying that corporate charters are diﬃcult to amend); Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter
Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1825-31 (1989); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1416 (1989) (“[T]he corporate charter is at best a
contract of adhesion . . . .”). But see Geeyoung Min, Shareholder Voice in Corporate Charter
Amendments, 43 J. CORP. L. 289, 303-04 (2018) (documenting an uptick in amendment frequency
for the top 200 companies in U.S. markets after 2005).
26 Several appendices (both attached and online at www.publiccompanycharters.com) provide
additional details about our study design, results, robustness checks, and access to the corpus itself.
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A. Demand
The ﬁeld of law and ﬁnance is, in relative terms, extremely young. Until
about twenty-ﬁve years ago, ﬁnance and business law researchers typically
sailed on scholarly ships that passed in the night: ﬁnancial economists
gravitated toward theoretical models and data-driven explorations, while legal
scholars immersed themselves in institutional detail, exploring rich
contextual structures that seemingly deﬁed quantiﬁcation.27
Change began to take hold, however, with a series of seminal articles in
the mid-1990s. A collection of prominent ﬁnance scholars set about exploring
how legal institutions aﬀect proﬁt generation, market value, and other
relevant corporate outcomes. At the vanguard of the eﬀort were several
provocative papers by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny
(LLSV).28 LLSV explored how formal country-level shareholder protections
are correlated to or predict several important measures of company and
shareholder value. To quantify their analysis, LLSV canvassed
interjurisdictional protections to formulate an “antidirector rights index”—a
country-level proxy for shareholder rights. LLSV’s collective contributions
were an instant classic, and for good reason: they demonstrated concretely
how law “mattered” for nearly all aspects of ﬁnance. Tens of thousands of
articles have cited LLSV, in both widely respected law and ﬁnance/economics
journals.29 Using the index, LLSV and hundreds of others generated a
laundry list of provocative and inﬂuential ﬁndings.30 And legions of other
articles to date have incorporated LLSV’s index or its underlying data as
inputs31 to establish connections between shareholder protection and the
27 The common use of quantitative metrics to analyze corporate governance is very much a
post-1995 phenomenon. See generally sources cited supra note 10.
28 See La Porta et al., supra note 6; Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei
Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997); Rafael
La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54
J. FIN. 471 (1999); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny,
Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 7403,
1999), http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=227583 [https://perma.cc/QJ7Y-CVPE]; Rafael
La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Agency Problems and
Dividend Policies Around the World, 55 J. FIN. 1 (2000).
29 According to Lexis, LLSV’s article was referenced 23,811 times as of October 25, 2021,
including in some of the highest-proﬁle journals, such as the Quarterly Journal of Economics, Journal
of Financial Economics, and the Review of Financial Studies.
30 See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 28.
31 Spamann, supra note 10, at 468. For instance, Licht et al. used it to analyze the relationship
between culture and the level of minority shareholders’ and creditors’ protection, ﬁnding that
national cultural priorities consistent with public acceptance of litigation correlated with indices of
creditor and shareholder voting rights. Amir N. Licht et al., supra note 10. Reese and Weisbach also
used the index, ﬁnding that companies in legal systems with less shareholder protection were more
likely to cross-list in the United States. Reese & Weisbach, supra note 10, at 102.
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size of capital markets,32 ownership dispersion,33 firm valuation,34 and
earnings management.35
As inﬂuential as LLSV’s contributions were,36 it soon became evident that
their approach was just the tip of a much larger corporate governance iceberg.
As lawyers know all too well, much of contemporary business law consists of
a set of background rules that can give way if ﬁrms take steps to modify their
application or opt out completely.37 Setting the jurisdiction as the unit of
analysis inevitably misses (or mushes) this ﬁrm-level heterogeneity.
That lacuna was soon to be ﬁlled by another watershed contribution, this
time courtesy of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (GIM).38 GIM introduced a
then-novel third-party dataset created by the Investor Responsibility
Resource Center (IRRC), which purported to quantify shareholder
protections at the individual ﬁrm level, accounting for both jurisdiction-level
diﬀerences and ﬁrms’ private ordering decisions.39 Their data tracked a cross
section of large U.S.-traded issuers over several years. Consequently, the
governance data that GIM marshaled included much of the granularity and
panel structure that LLSV lacked, facilitating a far richer analysis of the
interaction between governance and outcomes.
Not to be out-Mamboed in the governance index dance-oﬀ, GIM
proposed an index of their own—the “G-Index”—which represented the sum
of 24 binary variables from their dataset related to shareholder protections,
antitakeover measures, and governance rights. They oﬀered the G-Index as a
rough proxy for good governance: lower G-Index scores corresponded to more
“democratic” or shareholder-friendly ﬁrms, while higher scores corresponded
to “dictatorial” or management-friendly ﬁrms. And when the authors
projected these scores onto several ﬁnancial performance metrics, their
ﬁndings were noteworthy: they showed that companies with relatively
democratic governance proﬁles outperformed their more dictatorial
counterparts along multiple dimensions, including ﬁrm value, proﬁtability,

Spamann, supra note 10, at 480.
Id. at 467-68.
Id. at 468 n.2.
Id.
We note that LLSV’s contributions, like much of empirical corporate ﬁnance, could only
suggest causal connections, but did not have an “identiﬁcation strategy” to test such claims.
37 Gillian Hadﬁeld & Eric Talley, On Public Versus Private Provision of Corporate Law, 22 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 414, 418 (2006) (“[B]ecause of the centrality of the immutable characteristics of
corporate status . . . it is necessary for a company to first choose a state within which to incorporate, and
only then to contemplate adapting the corporate code’s default terms to match explicit corporate needs.”).
38 Gompers et al., supra note 6.
39 Today, the IRRC database is also referred to as the ISS Legacy database. See infra text
accompanying note 80.
32
33
34
35
36
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and growth.40 But one result in particular stood out: that good governance
was also a ﬁnancial arbitrage opportunity.41 GIM estimated that a “longshort” investment strategy of (a) buying companies with the most democratic
proﬁles, and (b) selling short the most dictatorial ones delivered a riskadjusted return that outperformed the market by an eye-popping 9% per year, a
wedge that confounded explanation by accepted theories in ﬁnance.42
If LLSV was an instant classic, then GIM was a mic drop.
Notwithstanding its more recent vintage, as of October 25, 2021, GIM has
been cited by more than 9,900 academic articles,43 and it is the seventy-ninth
most downloaded paper of all time on the Social Science Research Network.44
Scores of follow-on papers have either employed the G-Index directly, have
attempted to build upon it, or have attempted to test it in other settings.
The decades since GIM’s contribution, in fact, have spawned an alphabet
soup of governance indices, all derived directly from the same foundational
data used to construct the G-Index. These include the “E-index” (a subset of
the G-Index measuring management entrenchment),45 the “O-index” (a
subset of the G-Index that does not include the E-index),46 and the “D-index”
(the Deterrence index, measuring takeover defense),47 among others.48
Others have used the G-Index (or its variations) as a jumping-oﬀ point for
new empirical corporate governance research. One study, for example, relied
on the same data to argue that ﬁrms with weaker governance structures have
smaller cash reserves.49 Another contribution used the G-Index to test
whether weak governance causes diminished stock returns.50 And yet another
40 Gompers et al., supra note 6, at 121-29; see also Bernard Black, Antonio Gledson de Carvalho,
Vikramaditya Khanna, Woochan Kim & Burcin Yurtoglu, Corporate Governance Indices and Construct
Validity, 25 CORP. GOVERNANCE 397 (2017) (assessing the validity of governance indices in four
major emerging markets).
41 Gompers et al., supra note 6, at 121-25.
42 Id.
43 The citation count is available via the Social Science Research Network. Articles citing
Gompers have appeared in multiple volumes of some of the most cited journals, such as the
Quarterly Journal of Economics, the Journal of Finance, the Journal of Financial Economics, and the
Review of Financial Studies.
44 Paul A. Gompers, Joy L. Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity Prices,
SOC. SCI. RSCH. NETWORK, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=278920 [https://
perma.cc/6TXR-5GQS].
45 Melih Madanoglu & Ersem Karadag, Corporate Governance Provisions and Firm Financial
Performance, 28 INT’L J. CONTEMP. HOSP. MGMT. 1805, 1806 (2015).
46 Bebchuk et al., What Matters, supra note 11, at 796.
47 Karpoﬀ et al., supra note 11, at 2361.
48 See generally Straska & Waller, supra note 10, at 933 (noting that over 1,900 scholarly articles
on antitakeover provisions were published between 1980 and 2011).
49 Jarrad Harford, Sattar A. Mansi & William F. Maxwell, Corporate Governance and Firm Cash
Holdings in the US, 87 J. FIN. ECON. 535, 537 (2008) (relying on the G-Index to test their hypothesis).
50 Core et al., supra note 11, at 655-58 (relying on the G-Index to test their hypothesis).
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used the G-Index as a proxy for the strength of a ﬁrm’s other governance
mechanisms to show the signiﬁcant impact that female directors had on a
board’s inputs and ﬁrm’s outcomes.51 Several critics have also emerged, too,
questioning the generality and longevity of the G-Index’s relationship to
outcomes, and observing that such eﬀects appear to change materially in the
periods after the publication of GIM’s study.52
While these various follow-on contributions diﬀer in many respects, they
have one thing in common: they all place abiding faith in the integrity of the
data that impelled GIM. And they have done so—across disparate areas of
law, ﬁnance, accounting and economics—with considerable zeal.53 Even those
who have come out as critical of the governance index enterprise have based
their arguments largely on the indices’ predictive qualities, presuming the
accuracy of the underlying indices.54
The demand for data-driven corporate governance insights, moreover,
transcends academia. It also extends to professional governance advocates,
Wall Street investors,55 and even government regulators. The U.S Securities
and Exchange Commission, for example, routinely uses the empirical
corporate governance literature—including LLSV and GIM—in rulemaking.
For example, a recent proposal to amend federal proxy rules cites both studies,
interpreting them to demonstrate that “[s]trong shareholder rights have been
51 Renée B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Women in the Boardroom and Their Impact on Governance
and Performance, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 291, 292 (2009) (relying on the G-Index to test their hypothesis).
52 See, e.g., Klausner, supra note 11, at 1364 (asserting that the G-Index has two major weaknesses
and accordingly “does not do what it has been understood to do”); Robert M. Daines, Ian D. Gow
& David F. Larcker, Rating the Ratings: How Good Are Commercial Governance Ratings?, 98 J. FIN.
ECON. 439, 441-42, 452 n.26 (2010) (noting that other studies have questioned the validity of the
G-Index and drawing attention to a study which demonstrated that GIM’s ﬁndings regarding equity
performance do not extend beyond GIM’s sample period); Bebchuk et al., Disappearing Association,
supra note 11, at 324 (“[C]onsistent with the learning hypothesis, the association between the
governance indices did not persist. Using the exact methods employed by GIM . . . for 1990–1999,
we ﬁnd that this association did not exist during the subsequent period of 2000-2008.”).
53 See Bebchuk et al., What Matters, supra note 11, at 784 (calling Gompers et al.’s paper
“inﬂuential”); Genc Alimehmeti & Angelo Paletta, Corporate Governance Indexes: The Confounding
Eﬀects of Using Diﬀerent Measures, 4 J. APPLIED ECON. & BUS. RSCH. 64, 65 (2014) (describing
Gompers et al.’s paper as a “landmark” paper); Beth Ahlering & Simon Deakin, Labor Regulation,
Corporate Governance, and Legal Origin: A Case of Institutional Complementarity?, 41 L. & SOC’Y REV.
865, 866 (2007) (noting that La Porta et al.’s research has “inform[ed] the policy and working
methods of the World Bank and other international ﬁnancial institutions”); John C. Coﬀee, Jr., The
Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control,
111 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (2001) (referring to La Porta et al.’s law-and-ﬁnance scholarship as “seminal”);
Soﬁe Cools, The Real Diﬀerence in Corporate Law Between the United States and Continental Europe:
Distribution of Powers, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 697, 699 (2005) (same); Nicholas Thompson, Common
Denominator, LEGAL AFFS. (Jan./Feb. 2005), https://www.legalaﬀairs.org/issues/January-February2005/feature_thompson_janfeb05.msp [https://perma.cc/AAB3-N55S] (describing La Porta et al.’s
impact as inﬂuential).
54 See generally Daines et al., supra note 52; Bebchuk et al., Disappearing Association, supra note 11.
55 Eldar, supra note 5 (manuscript at 4-5).
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associated with higher firm valuations and better-developed equity markets.”56
The SEC has cited empirical literature in a proposed rule on investment
advisors and broker-dealers,57 in a report on M&A disclosure requirements,58
and in a proposed rule on accelerated filers.59 Earlier this year, the SEC cited
LLSV again in a final rule on good faith determinations of fair value.60
Clearly, empirical corporate governance research, and the abecedarian
conga line of indices it spawned, have become a centerpiece of both academic
discourse and regulatory decision making. That attention, in turn, has stoked
demand for more resources (quantitative data in particular) that could power
additional insights to help adjudicate policy debates. But a demand for
empirical corporate governance resources would remain unrequited without
a corresponding supply. As we detail in the next subsection, that supply chain
has proven to be limited, expensive, and undependable.
B. Supply
The seemingly insatiable demand for quantitative corporate governance
resources has always faced serious supply shortages. Indeed, as provocative as
the ﬁndings of LLSV, GIM and their progeny were, perhaps their most
enduring contributions were the new data they brought to the table,
quantifying governance for the ﬁrst time.
But the sheer novelty of these efforts was also their Achilles’ heel.
Turning nebulous bodies of prolix corporate governance texts into concrete,
measurable, usable data requires an unusual mélange of quantitative skill,
economic intuition, and—most importantly—lawyerly chops. Corporate
governance regimes are typically conjured from a dense thicket of
documents, statutes, legislative histories, case law, and a superstructure of
interpretive canons. Parsing these inputs into usable data is all but
impossible without legal training. Even today, very few possess the requisite

56 Universal Proxy, 81 Fed. Reg. 79,122, 79,158 (proposed Nov. 10, 2016) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
57 Form CRS Relationship Summary; Amendments to Form ADV; Required Disclosures in
Retail Communications and Restrictions on the Use of Certain Names or Titles, 83 Fed. Reg.
21,416, 21,442 nn.233-38, 21,485 nn.575-76 (proposed May 9, 2018) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
240, 249, 275, 279).
58 Amendments to Financial Disclosures About Acquired and Disposed Businesses, 85 Fed.
Reg. 54,002, 54,043 n.442 (Aug. 31, 2020).
59 Form CRS Relationship Summary; Amendments to Form ADV; Required Disclosures
in Retail Communications and Restrictions on the Use of Certain Names or Titles, 83 Fed. Reg.
at 21,442 nn.233-238.
60 Good Faith Determinations of Fair Value, 86 Fed. Reg. 748, 795 n.622 (Jan. 6, 2021) (to be
codiﬁed at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 270).
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skills to peel back the layers of this institutional onion. This skill set was
rarer still a quarter-century ago.61
The diﬃculties of “coding law” were immediately apparent even in the
early studies that analyzed jurisdictional corporate governance regimes.
These studies, starting with LLSV’s pioneering work, had to quantify
country-level legal protections. To go about doing so, the authors needed to
assess—across over four dozen national jurisdictions—six mechanisms for
investor protection.62 Having little or no legal training themselves, the
authors eventually farmed out the work, surveying local lawyers in each
jurisdiction to identify whether the jurisdiction had the various enumerated
investor protections of interest.63
The resulting methodology was innovative for its time, but it was also
frustratingly opaque. There is scant information about how LLSV identiﬁed
their respondents or the respondents’ expertise. There is also no information
on how the authors dealt with inter-respondent inconsistencies. As others
soon noticed, these types of inconsistencies proved commonplace.
No one seriously endeavored to interrogate the underlying anti-directors
rights index itself until 2010, when Holger Spamann began kicking its tires in
a replication study. Spamann used a more systematic approach to recruit and
orient foreign-trained lawyers to recode the majority of LLSV’s primary
jurisdictional data, taking significant care to ensure inter-coder reliability.64
When the dust settled, he found that many of the features contained within
the original index were incorrect, and—more importantly—that certain of the
most provocative results could not be replicated once the data were corrected.65
Spamann’s findings were careful, systematic, and ultimately devastating.
More generally, his analysis exposed larger problems that continue to vex
empirical corporate governance: the challenge of quantifying jurisdictional
legal factors that are themselves somewhat nuanced, the ambiguity that
occurs when a statutory mandate is overridden by ﬁrms that opt out of it, and
the deployment of personnel who had not been trained to assess these factors
See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE FUTURE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: ESSAYS IN REFORM
RECOLLECTION 2-7 (2016) (describing the maladaptation of trained economists to
understand law without formal legal training); Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, What Do
Lawyers Contribute to Law & Economics?, 38 YALE J. ON REGUL. 707, 716-20 (2021) (describing the
difference between economists who have little legal training and critical contributions of those
with legal training).
62 The six mechanisms were: shareholder voting by mail, voting without blocking of shares,
the limits on shareholders’ ability to call a special meeting, whether minority shareholders had
proportional board representation or cumulative voting, whether existing shareholders had a
preemptive right to buy new issuances of stock, and the types of judicial remedies available to
shareholders. La Porta et al., supra note 6, at 1127-28.
63 See, e.g., Spamann, supra note 10, at 467 (thanking over forty lawyers for their contributions).
64 Id. at 470.
65 Id. at 469-70.
61
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consistently. Challenges like these suﬀused LLSV’s data, and Spamann
surmised that the ensuing reliability issues may have been the byproduct of
diﬀerences in corporate practice66 and the fact that LLSV’s original survey
respondents were unclear about whether their remit was to answer questions
about formal legal mandates, prevailing private ordering norms, or their own
personal experiences.67
By the time Spamann’s deconstruction of LLSV hit the presses, many of
the cool kids of corporate governance were already chasing the next rainbow:
firm-level governance. Zeroing in on a more granular unit of analysis
constitutes a considerable improvement (for the reasons detailed above); yet
at the same time, the ﬁrm-level approach seems susceptible to many of the
same vulnerabilities that plagued LLSV. Maybe even worse: coding law
consistently at the jurisdiction level is hard enough; layering on ﬁrm-level
governance can complicate matters considerably. Not only must one correctly
interpret when and how companies have attempted to tailor their internal
governance aﬀairs, but one must do so against the backdrop of statutory and
jurisdictional rules.
Figure 1 conceptualizes some of these diﬃculties using a planetary
metaphor for corporate governance choices. A statute/regulation (represented
by the black hole at the system’s center) represents a ﬁxed background rule
on corporate governance that applies to companies incorporated in the
jurisdiction. Should an entity (represented by the various planets) wish to
replace that rule and with its own self-styled regime, it is as though it needs
to break the gravitational pull of the statutory mandate.
For certain governance mandates, opting out is impossible, as depicted
by the inner red planet. Here, the statutory rule is immutable, with a
gravitational pull so strong as to trap all objects within its event horizon. If
a company within this zone wished to embrace a different regime, its efforts
would be null and void.68 In other situations (represented by the successively
more distant planets), the gravitational pull of the mandate is weaker. Here,
Id. at 473.
As Spamann notes in his 2010 review of La Porta et al., supra note 6, practitioners
inconsistently interpreted La Porta et al.’s questions. For example, neither Finland nor the United
States defaults to cumulative voting, but La Porta et al. coded Finland as zero and the United States
as one. Spamann, supra note 10, at 472.
68 Pennsylvania’s famous constituency statute, for example, does not allow companies to waive
or avoid the statutory mandate that the board must account for multiple stakeholders’ interests. 15
PA. CONS. STAT. § 1715(b) (2021). See also Robert Goodyear Murray, Money Talks, Constituents Walk:
Pennsylvania’s Corporate Constituency Statute Can Maximize Shareholders’ Wealth, 48 BUFF. L. REV.
629, 644 (2000) (opining that Pennsylvania’s constituency statute “is a speciﬁc grant of discretion to
directors to determine which constituency group’s interests to elevate above others, ranking
shareholders as only one of the interests and not giving them a priority interest”). Similarly,
Delaware corporations can extend bylaw amendment power to directors only if done through a
provision in the articles of incorporation. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109 (2020).
66
67
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the statute specifies a default rule,69 theoretically permitting firms to embrace
self-styled regimes through private ordering. But here too, differing
requirements may apply if a firm is to achieve the needed escape velocity to
break away: the most tenacious types of default rules (conceptualized
through the orange planet) require nothing less than a charter provision to
opt out.70 Other default mandates are less sticky, giving way as well to
contraventions in “lower level” corporate documents—such as a shareholderenacted bylaw (yellow planet), an ordinary bylaw (purple),71 or a simple
board resolution (green).72
Figure 1: Statutory Mandates and Achieving Opt-Out Escape Velocity

Even when a state law provision permits opt-outs, and even if the
corporation takes the requisite steps to achieve escape velocity, another layer
of complexity awaits: the corporation may still not be free to explore all
parsecs of the corporate governance universe because state law often deems
certain types of self-styled regimes to be oﬀ limits.73 The upshot of this
69 See generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989) (“Default rules ﬁll the gaps in incomplete
contracts; they govern unless the parties contract around them.”).
70 Delaware’s staggered board statute, for example, requires that any board stagger be
eﬀectuated through the charter, initial bylaw, or a shareholder-promulgated bylaw. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2020).
71 In this category, and in the remaining ones, the stated means for opting out is suﬃcient, but
any “higher level” document can generally accomplish the task too. Consequently, because charters
are at the top of the corporate governance pecking order, a charter provision would also be suﬃcient
to opt out of a state mandate that allows opt-outs through a “lower level” document, such as a
shareholder approved bylaw.
72 For example, Delaware permits corporations the option to provide for proxy expense
reimbursement to activists through ordinary bylaw provisions. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 113(a) (2020).
73 For instance, while Delaware permits ﬁrms to include a forum selection provision in its
bylaws, it prohibits a corporation to exclude Delaware courts from hearing “internal corporate
claims.” DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (2020). And Maryland gives shareholders a default right to
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discussion is that for many dimensions of corporate governance, the regime
that ultimately applies to the ﬁrm requires understanding (a) what the state’s
substantive background mandate is; (b) whether that mandate permits opting
out; (c) what the lowest-level document is for executing an opt-out; (d) what
the constrained choices are for the opting-out entity; and (e) whether the
corporation has succeeded in opting out in a manner that complies with (a)
through (d). In short, it is logical, but it’s also complicated.
So how does the firm-level data GIM relied on fare in this more complicated
environment? Unfortunately, we simply do not know at first blush. Even as
compared to LLSV’s index, the IRRC data used by GIM are surprisingly
opaque and poorly documented. Little remains (if it ever existed) about what
went into it. In fact, the dataset appears to have had no detailed manual, but it
instead refers interlocutors to the appendix of the GIM paper,74 a curious move
since that appendix only cursorily describes the variable definitions, with little
mention of data gathering and quality control measures.75 And, as detailed
above, there does not appear to have been any researcher with the time and
resources to interrogate the firm-level IRRC data used by GIM.76
Consequently, today’s researchers have scant information about how the
IRRC constructed their labels.77 We know little about what documents they
consulted—state law, charters, bylaws, or something else entirely. There is no
information about how coders resolved inconsistencies between the
documents, if they considered multiple documents at all. There is no
indication about the credentials of the coders themselves, or measures to
ensure inter-coder consistency. And there is only a small amount of
information about the nuances of state laws.78 For example, when the coders
noted that a state law existed on a particular topic, did they assess whether
the state law immutably required something of corporations? Or was the state
convene a special meeting with the support of 25% votable shares. Corporations are allowed through
their bylaws to increase that threshold, but they are not allowed to increase it beyond 50%. MD.
CODE ANN., Corps. & Ass’ns § 2-502 (LexisNexis 2021).
74 See Overview of IRRC Governance Database in WRDS, WHARTON RSCH. DATA SERVS.,
https://wrds-www.wharton.upenn.edu/documents/718/Overview_of_IRRC_Legacy_Governance_
Deﬁnitions.pdf [https://perma.cc/P2F8-X6VM]. Our review of the IRRC Corporate Takeover
Defenses data did not reveal a methodology section.
75 Gompers et al., supra note 6, at 145-50.
76 The original companion manuals to the data set are surprisingly hard to ﬁnd. We searched
in every law library in the United States and mobilized the combined forces of our respective
institutional librarians, including contacts at law ﬁrms. After weeks of searching, we managed to
ﬁnd a few examples, whose methodology descriptions were frustratingly opaque. See infra note 77.
77 Although an annual IRRC publication described the various label categories, it does not
touch on the methodology of data collection or the training/expertise of the labelers themselves. See,
e.g., VIRGINIA K. ROSENBAUM, CORPORATE TAKEOVER DEFENSES 1998, at ix (1998) (devoting
all of three short sentences to data collection protocols).
78 See infra Appendix B notes 219–220 and accompanying text.
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law a default that allowed corporations to opt out? Or was the state law silent,
and allowed corporations to opt-in?
The IRRC data’s issues are compounded further by a rotisserie of
corporate ownership changes: in 2005, IRRC was acquired by ISS.79 And two
years later, RiskMetrics acquired ISS, changing data gathering protocols and
retiring the IRRC data into “Legacy” status.80 The contemporary ISS dataset
has improved documentation, but it is still slim, and in any event it covers
only a loosely overlapping set of variables with IRRC’s, excluding critical
ingredients in the G-Index. As a result, it is now impossible to extend GIndex data computations beyond 2006.81 For those interested in slicing and
dicing the G-Index, then, they must largely do so inside a time capsule from
the 1990s and early 2000s.
Nevertheless, the robust demand for governance studies has induced
legions of contemporary scholars to return to the original wellspring of the
IRRC (and the associated G-Index) to study governance, assuming those
data to be accurate and hoping to say something generalizable to
contemporary settings. Top finance journals continue to publish research
that is based on those early data.82 One notable contribution83 even
extended the IRRC data and G-Index going backwards in time (from 1978–
1989) using a subsample of companies, but in doing so it also largely
presumed the integrity of the IRRC database itself. And while the moving
tectonic plates of empirical corporate governance literature are increasingly
exposing concerns regarding methodological designs,84 data integrity85 and
79 Robert Kropp, SRI Field Continues to Shift with RiskMetrics’ Acquisition of KLD, GREENBIZ
(Nov. 6, 2009), https://www.greenbiz.com/article/sri-ﬁeld-continues-shift-riskmetrics-acquisitionkld [https://perma.cc/W3M6-L2YN].
80 Changes in ISS (formerly RiskMetrics) Governance Database for 2007, WHARTON RSCH. DATA
SERV. [hereinafter ISS], https://wrds-www.wharton.upenn.edu/pages/support/manuals-andoverviews/iss-formerly-riskmetrics/changes-iss-formerly-riskmetrics-governance-database2007 [https://perma.cc/P6T5-5FGR].
81 For example, the ISS data set no longer tracks board or oﬃcer exculpation provisions (in
either charters or bylaws), which is one of the ingredients of the G-Index. See generally id.
82 See, e.g., Karpoﬀ et al., supra note 11, at 2361-62 (employing an instrumental variables strategy
on the G-Index in an attempt to tease out causal inference). When a variable being instrumented
for is subject to measurement error, however, it can generate spurious results. See, e.g., Dan A. Black,
Mark C. Berger & Frank A. Scott, Bounding Parameter Estimates with Nonclassical Measurement Error,
95 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 739, 739 (2000).
83 See Cremers & Ferrell, supra note 10. We discuss this important paper in the context of our
project at greater length infra note 116.
84 See Yair Listokin, Interpreting Empirical Estimates of the Eﬀect of Corporate Governance, 10 AM.
L. & ECON. REV. 90, 90 (2008) (noting that existing studies ignore the possibility of disparate
treatment eﬀects across diﬀerent companies, and also fail to address endogeneity issues).
85 See Emiliano M. Catan, The Insignificance of Clear-Day Poison Pills, 48 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1
(2019) (noting the need to use hand-collected data, and ﬁnding that past studies that concluded that
the adoption of pills was indicative of bad governance were based on ﬁndings of spurious
correlation); Emiliano M. Catan & Marcel Kahan, The Law and Finance of Antitakeover Statutes, 68
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empirical design,86 the IRRC and the G-Index have largely remained
uninterrogated.
Although there are a few alternatives to the IRRC index, those that exist
are problematic too. The contemporary ISS dataset87 oﬀers a variety of
governance metrics, but it does not oﬀer enough of them to replicate wellknown indices, and its protocols appear somewhat diﬀerent from IRRC’s
even for the same variables it traces. It, too, has relatively poor
documentation, and seems potentially vulnerable to similar coding errors.88
Another popular data provider, Factset,89 tracks even fewer governance
metrics than ISS, and it is diﬃcult to obtain data for historical years. And
another, Compact Disclosure, is poorly organized for this particular task, and
it ceased all updates in 2006.90
Without cataloguing the remaining (modest) list of other governance
datasets, none of them can be easily quality checked without access to the
underlying documents from which they are purportedly built. And yet, none
of these sources (that we are aware of) allows users to access the texts on
which their data labels are based. To audit accuracy, then, one must recover
these documents independently, read them for legal import, and conﬁrm
whether the assigned label is correct.
And this is where the challenge really begins. Even if one possessed the
skills (and resources and patience) to weed through mountains of raw
governance documents for substantive content, simply gaining access to an
organized corpus of them is surprisingly hard. In theory, of course, lots of
corporate governance documents are in the public domain, and state and
federal governments have the means to provide organized access to them.
Moreover, statutes and case law are but a quick internet search away.
Harvesting this information should not be all that diﬃcult, should it?
Yet, irritatingly, it is. This article focuses on what would seem to be the
easiest of targets—articles of incorporation (also known as charters), a

STAN. L. REV. 629, 629 (2016) (noting that finance studies in the past have failed to omit control
variables, have used improper specifications, contained data errors, and often selected data in
a biased manner).
86 See Robert Bartlett & Frank Partnoy, The Misuse of Tobin’s q, 73 VAND. L. REV. 353, 353-54
(2020) (noting that the use of Tobin’s q itself indicates poor empirical design because Tobin’s q is
numerically ﬂawed).
87 See ISS, supra note 80.
88 In Online Appendix C, we show that the contemporary ISS governance data also appear to be
hampered by significant errors as judged by our newly compiled data (though not as severe as IRRC’s).
89 See Data Solutions, F ACTSET , https://www.factset.com/solutions/business-needs/datasolutions [https://perma.cc/WSC9-7X7G].
90 See Compact Disclosure News, BINGHAMTON UNIV. LIBR. NEWS (Nov. 2, 2006),
https://libnews.binghamton.edu/news/2006/11/02/compact-disclosure-news [https://perma.cc/57FJ5X59] (noting that the publisher of Compact Disclosure ceased publication of the product in 2006).
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corporation’s ﬁrst and most important corporate governance document.91 The
charter is critical, for it is both a corporation’s birth certiﬁcate and its
constitution: to form a corporation in any U.S. jurisdiction, an incorporator
must ﬁrst ﬁle a charter (including within it a host of necessary ingredients)
with a state secretary of state, who in turn maintains repositories of such
documents.92 And for publicly traded companies, charters also must be ﬁled
with the SEC.93 In theory, then, public company charters should be readily
available from both state and federal sources.94 In practice, however,
extracting the text of contemporary charters on a wide-scale basis is tricky,
expensive, and time consuming.
Consider what might be the most obvious strategy: approach relevant
state governments to gain access to their primary documents. Good luck:
Delaware, where the majority of public companies are incorporated,95 makes
it risibly diﬃcult to obtain corporate charters in native form. By way of
example, consider the task of assembling the chartering history of Google’s
parent company, Alphabet Inc. Although it is a Delaware-incorporated entity,
searching on the Delaware Secretary of State’s website yielded no results: the
entity search function returns only the ﬁrst ﬁfty hits matching “Alphabet,”
and Alphabet Inc. was not among them.96 But even if Alphabet Inc. had been
among the ﬁrst ﬁfty, obtaining information about whether the entity is active
requires one to pay a $10 fee. To obtain an inventory of all documents ﬁled in
the state by that entity would cost an additional $175 for each registrant.97
91 Although corporations often have numerous governance documents, the most important one
is the charter. In addition to charters and bylaws, corporations generally have additional governance
documents, such as committee charters, corporate governance guidelines, and a variety of other
documents that corporations adopt to meet stock exchange, regulatory, and other requirements. See
generally Sarah C. Haan, Shareholder Proposal Settlements and the Private Ordering of Public Elections,
126 YALE L.J. 262 (2016) (showing that many corporate disclosures about campaign ﬁnance are made
as the result of negotiated private settlements with shareholders); Yaron Nili & Cathy Hwang,
Shadow Governance, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 1097, 1107-08 (2020) (noting the importance of charters and
bylaws, and how shareholders and management both vie to exert inﬂuence and restrict the other’s
inﬂuence and control).
92 What are Articles of Incorporation?, HARBOR COMPLIANCE, https://www.harborcompliance.com/
information/what-are-articles-of-incorporation [https://perma.cc/S3SE-BCET].
93 17 C.F.R. § 229.601(b)(3)(i) (2021).
94 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78m (indicating that charters should be available from federal sources).
95 About the Division of Corporations, DEL. DIV. OF CORPS., https://corp.delaware.gov/
aboutagency [https://perma.cc/9QXE-6DTF] (noting that more than 66% of the Fortune 500 are
incorporated in Delaware).
96 Department of State: Division of Corporations, DEL. DIV. OF CORPS., https://icis.corp.delaware.gov/
Ecorp/EntitySearch/NameSearch.aspx (last visited Aug. 30, 2021).
97 See Accessing Corporate Information, DEL. DIV. OF CORPS., https://corp.delaware.gov/
directweb [https://perma.cc/9FW3-4WVS] (describing the process of requesting documents).
While at ﬁrst blush there appears to be a cheaper $20 option to access a list of ﬁled documents, that
list only shows the last ﬁve documents ﬁled. (To discover this informational nugget, a research
assistant spent twenty minutes on the phone with the Delaware Secretary of State’s oﬃce.)
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All this, of course, still falls short of producing the raw texts themselves.
For that, one would additionally have to make a formal document request for
each individual entity with the Delaware Department of State, incurring a
per-document fee of $10 for the ﬁrst page plus $2 for each additional page.98
After some period of days or weeks, a hard-copy packet would arrive in the
mail, whereupon the researcher would need to use character recognition
technology to scan and digitize its contents.99 The costs quickly add up: there
are 1,568 Delaware-incorporated issuers in our corpus, comprising about 60%
of the total number we track across all U.S. states. Delaware entities have a
mean chartering history of 3.47 documents per issuer, and an average length
of 11.46 pages per document.100 All told, if one wholly disregards labor costs,
and further assumes no expediting costs ($1,000 per document for same-day
service101), we estimate that the Delaware Department of State would charge
no less than $442,645102 simply to replicate three-ﬁfths of the textual corpus
we unveil (free of charge) in this article.103
Similar attempts to obtain primary documents from New York,
California, Nevada, and Massachusetts fared little better: in each state, we
grappled with decades-old computer systems, spent hours on the phone, and
were oﬀered seemingly random collections of charter documents to be
dribbled out over the course of days or weeks, usually for hundreds of dollars.
In any realistic sense, then, seeking out governance documents from state
repositories is a non-starter.

98 For the current fee schedule, see DEL. DEP’T OF STATE, DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS
FEE SCHEDULE (2020), https://corpﬁles.delaware.gov/Augustfee2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/YJJ5Z2WM]. Although Delaware evidently maintains the entire collection in digital form, the
cumbersome process described in the text appears non-negotiable, even for pure researchers. Early
in this project and armed with the written endorsement of Hon. Leo Strine (the then-sitting Chief
Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court), we approached Delaware’s Deputy Secretary of State and
Director of Division of Corporations requesting access to the state’s corpus (on a conﬁdential basis).
Our attempt was quickly rebuﬀed. See E-mail from Kristopher Knight, Deputy Sec’y of State, Del.
Dep’t of State, to Eric Talley (Aug. 31, 2017) (on ﬁle with authors) (“I appreciate the oﬀer, but the
Division has a long-standing practice of not participating in such arrangements.”).
99 Alternatively, one could take a quick sojourn to Dover, Delaware—about an hour’s drive south
of Interstate 95, and coincidentally abutting the scenic Bombay Hook National Wildlife Refuge—
where one could then enjoy the privilege of queuing up for one of the state-issue public terminals to
access and print documents (for one hour at a time as we understand, if other users are waiting).
100 This ﬁgure is based on a mean word count of 4,219 at an average of 368 words per page. See
infra Part II for a more fulsome analysis of these measures.
101 See DEL. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 98.
102 This figure ignores the $10 fee to gauge whether the firm is active, but includes the Long Form
certificate of filings, resulting in a total cost computed by [$175 + $10 (3.47) + $2 (3.47) (11.46 - 1)] × 1568.
103 We were unable to determine how much revenue the Delaware Secretary of State’s oﬃce
generates in charging for access to these ostensibly public documents. Consequently, we cannot
estimate how our eﬀorts to make a sizable corpus of them freely available to the public may cut into
these revenue margins.
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Those interested in publicly traded companies have two other possible
avenues. First, many companies’ investor relations websites contain charters.
Their digital format is far from uniform, however, and they typically contain
only current (but not historical) versions, frustrating researchers who wish to
study governance both cross-sectionally and over time. Consequently, such
sources have limited value.
The other option (and the one we ultimately pursued here) is to go to the
SEC, which maintains a repository of current and historical ﬁlings that users
can access for free—depending on how one deﬁnes free. To be sure, public
companies are required to ﬁle up-to-date charters with the SEC, and the
Commission duly records all public ﬁlings since its Electronic Data
Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system (EDGAR) went live in 1995.104
That said, EDGAR proves to be a cumbersome hunting ground for
governance documents. The interface is notoriously hard to ﬁlter and
search,105 and locating charters is particularly challenging. Although
components of EDGAR ﬁlings have become predictable and regularized over
the years, corporate charters and bylaws have not, and their disclosed content
is often squirreled away in odd and irregular places.106 And, because EDGAR
only has ﬁlings from the mid-1990s, locating pre-1990s materials requires
submitting a records request to the SEC—an exercise that, reminiscent of
state regulators, requires Byzantine paperwork,107 a twenty-day processing
period, and an hourly processing fee for the lucky employee charged with
hunting down the documents.108

104 15 U.S.C. § 78m; see also History of EDGAR, EDGAR PRO, https://help.edgar-online.com/
edgar/history.asp?site= [https://perma.cc/C2P5-6YJY].
105 Several practitioners have even authored how-to articles on EDGAR use. See, e.g., Duﬀ
McDonald, Unscrambling EDGAR: The SEC’s Stock Database Is Torture to Use. But Help Is Out There,
MONEY, June 1999, at 175.
106 In theory, issuers are supposed to tag their charters as “Exhibit 3” in the context of
periodic filings (10-K, 10-Q) and current reports (8-K). See 17 C.F.R. § 229.601 (2021). But in
practice, these tags are applied with varying degrees of consistency. For example, Biglari Holdings
Inc.’s 2018 S-4 registration statement contains the text of its charter in a section labeled “Annex
II,” NBHSA Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-4) Annex II (Dec. 22, 2017), while Parkway
Property Inc.’s 1996 charter is in “Exhibit B” to the companies’ preliminary proxy statement.
Parkway Co, Preliminary Proxy Statement (Form PRE 14A) Exhibit B (May 3, 1996). These
tagging inconsistencies appear also to frustrate the search algorithms of commercial services. See
John Gerdes Jr., EDGAR-Analyzer: Automating the Analysis of Corporate Data Contained in the SEC’s
EDGAR Database, 35 DECISION SUPPORT SYS. 7, 8 (2003) (describing SGML tags and identifying
challenges posed by improper tagging).
107 See Public Documents, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/
answerspublicdocshtm.html [https://perma.cc/Y8AL-VH38] (providing instructions on how to
request records not available on the SEC website).
108 Schedule of Fees for Record Services, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/foia/
feesche.htm [https://perma.cc/24KK-65FG].
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A related strategy for the exhausted researcher might be to leverage
commercial search platforms, such as Westlaw, LexisNexis, and Bloomberg,
which also track EDGAR ﬁlings but purport to oﬀer user-friendly search
conduits. Our research suggests that Westlaw is perhaps the most
comprehensive for a project like ours, allowing researchers to search for
“articles of incorporation/bylaws” for individual companies. However, after
comparing our manually collected corpus to Westlaw, it appears that Westlaw
compiles its data in a way that succumbs to the EDGAR ﬁling irregularities
described above.109 Consequently, extracting a ﬁrm’s chartering history on
Westlaw frequently results in troubling gaps in coverage. Holding that issue
aside, Westlaw’s search results often require extensive post-processing by
researchers seeking to build a usable panel of chartering histories. Westlaw
does provide researchers with unﬁltered lists of up to 1,000 documents that
may contain charters (interlaced with bylaws and many other texts). While
potentially useful, these lists usually contain duplicates110 and are ordered by
ﬁling date (which can be years or even decades after their eﬀective dates).
Even if one is lucky enough to locate comprehensive chartering histories
from a commercial provider like Westlaw, she will likely be prohibited from
using them for a project of any scale. Users can download no more than 100
text documents at once. With a combination of patience, ingenuity, and webscraping technology, one might be able to work around some of these technical
speed bumps, but doing so would almost certainly violate Westlaw’s user
agreement, subjecting the user to a lock on her account.111 Posting the results
publicly might also trigger the litigious wrath with which the company
enforces its user agreements.112 If one hopes to access and share the full textual
chartering histories for thousands of public companies, then, commercial data
providers oﬀer little refuge.113
109 Evidently, Westlaw (like other commercial providers) focuses exclusively on EDGAR
ﬁlings located under the “Exhibit 3” heading—the exhibit category supposedly designated for
charters and by-laws. In practice, as noted above, many companies disregard this heading mandate,
squirrelling away their governance documents under diﬀerent exhibit numbers (or none at all).
110 For example, Phase Forward Inc. adopted a new charter in the context of its IPO in July
2004. Diﬀerent versions of this document can be found in four diﬀerent ﬁlings from around the
time of the IPO, and all ﬁlings are represented as separate entries in Westlaw’s search results.
111 See Terms of Use, THOMSON REUTERS, https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/legal-notices/
terms-of-use [https://perma.cc/Q6BF-SL2B] (“[Y]ou will not reproduce, duplicate, copy, download,
store, further transmit, disseminate, transfer, or otherwise exploit this website, or any portion hereof
without Thomson Reuters’ prior written consent . . . .”).
112 See, e.g., Lancaster, supra note 23 (documenting the case of a legal-tech startup that was
driven from business from a lawsuit ﬁled by Westlaw’s parent company).
113 Our investigation of Westlaw’s main competitors revealed nearly identical terms of use
prohibitions, but with inferior search functionality. Lexis, for example, seems to require users to
search for speciﬁc terms or companies, which curtails the ability to even pull up all NASDAQ
companies at once.
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II. RECLAIMING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Given the paucity of existing data and the shortcomings in strategies for
gathering the data from scratch, researchers enjoy few attractive options, and
they are usually left to muddle through in an ad hoc way while adjusting
priorities and limiting their research designs.
This article endeavors to sweep away these obstacles, reclaiming the
textual DNA of corporate governance for all researchers in the process. In
this Part, we begin by unveiling the results of this multi-year enterprise: the
CCG, which involved harvesting by hand thousands of corporate charters
spanning the better part of three decades, cleaning them, labeling them, and
making the resulting corpus an open-source public good (as it always should
have been). We then spotlight several immediate payoﬀs of this eﬀort,
ranging from intriguing descriptive accounts of the corpus, to reassessing
heretofore accepted wisdoms in law and ﬁnance, to marshaling the emergent
tools of machine learning and computational text analysis to unpack the
myriad stories that these critical documents tell.
A. Charter Texts
Over the course of several years, we have been assembling a
comprehensive textual dataset containing present and historical charters of
almost 3,000 of the largest publicly traded companies in the United States.
Our dataset is based exclusively on digitized ﬁlings with the SEC made
available on the EDGAR database, therefore ensuring our ability to share it
as an open-source resource.
To ensure accuracy and comprehensive coverage, we harvest charters
manually, with the help of a small army of research assistants. Doing so allows
us to avoid the many pitfalls of the automated approaches evidently used by
commercial services. We use a formal organizational hierarchy and numerous
quality control measures to exercise quality control over our collection efforts.
Senior members of the team (law school graduates and advanced JD candidates)
cross-checked most information assembled by junior research assistants.114
The resulting dataset contains the chartering histories for 2,715
companies, starting with the ﬁrst fully restated charter the company uploaded

114 More details on our data gathering protocols can be found in Appendix B. Although we
consider our collection protocol to be a signiﬁcant improvement over standard commercial
providers, the biggest advantage of our dataset is its open-source nature. We make the dataset
available to the public, and we invite others to contribute to it and correct any mistakes that escaped
our quality control measures. We return to this point below in Part IV.
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onto EDGAR.115 For many companies, this is the ﬁrst full charter that was
ﬁled after EDGAR went live in 1995. For a majority of companies (around
57%), however, we are able to trace their charter history well back into the
1990s.116 In some cases (approximately 11%), we successfully extract a
chartering history to a year prior to 1990. Based on this harvested
information, we construct a textual corpus that treats an issuer’s charter
document in a given measuring year as the observational unit. In other words,
our dataset has a “panel” structure, observing the charter text(s) that governed
the internal aﬀairs of each active company as of January 1 of each year between
1990 and 2019.117
Even without elaborate data crunching, our corpus renders some
interesting insights about public company charters over time. Consider
charter length. In principle, certiﬁcates of incorporation could be quite short,
with most of the nitty-gritty baked into other governance documents (such
as bylaws).118 Indeed, most state statutes require charters to have only a few
informational ingredients,119 and they can be shorter than seventy-ﬁve

115 For approximately 200 companies in the corpus, we were unable to locate at least one fully
restated charter. Therefore, these companies are not included in the analyses presented here and in
Part III below.
116 A notable paper started down a route similar to ours, but ultimately chose a diﬀerent path
for a diﬀerent purpose. See Cremers & Ferrell, supra note 10. There, the authors tracked
approximately 1,000 companies from the IRRC data set backwards in time to the 1978–89 era. The
authors did not attempt to audit the G-Index itself over the IRRC years, but instead used a random
sample of IRRC observations from 1990 in order to emulate the labeling conventions of the IRRC.
Id. at 1172-73. They do not report on error rates they discovered in the IRRC, nor do they attempt
to assess whether the IRRC’s conventions were consistent with objective legal judgments. Unlike
this paper, the authors did not collect the raw corpus of governance documents, but instead focused
on generating labels only. (Neither their labels nor their constructed index is available to the public,
though they evidently have made their constructed index available to select researchers.)
117 Although we relegate most of our data collection protocols to Appendix B, one detail
warrants attention here. When a typical issuer amends its charter, its disclosure frequently takes the
form of a focused statement of the amendment, unaccompanied by a de novo restatement of the
entire amended charter. In fact, several such piecemeal disclosures will often stack up before an
issuer wrangles them into a full restatement. Manually interlacing such amendments into the preexisting charters proved infeasible. Instead, we aggregated full restatements and partial amendments
as follows: for each issuer in any year, we consider its charter to consist of (a) the most recently
disclosed full charter, appended by (b) all disclosed partial amendments executed after the
restatement in (a) but before the observation year. This protocol preserves information, but also
may lead to some distortions (such as the measured length of a charter). Therefore, where
appropriate (such as in Figure 2 below), we limit attention to only the most recent full restatement
(suppressing any intervening partial amendments).
118 See generally Nili & Hwang, supra note 91.
119 Typically, they require (a) the name of corporation; (b) its purpose or nature of its business;
(c) its oﬃcial address; (d) a description of corporation’s capital structure; and (e) duration of
corporation’s existence. Some statutes require descriptions of the incorporators, paid-in capital, and
initial board structure. See 1 MARVIN HYMAN & PUBLISHER’S EDITORIAL STAFF, CORPORATION
FORMS § 2:2, Westlaw (database updated June 2021).
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words.120 Public company charters are typically longer, but are still relatively
brief. In practice, however, the (full versions of) charters of publicly traded
companies are far longer, typically ranging between 1,000 and 12,000 words.
Figure 2: Mean Word Length (Full Charter Restatements)

Figure 2 depicts how the average length of charters in our corpus has
changed over time, with Delaware-incorporated issuers in black and nonDelaware companies in gray. Interestingly, the mean charter length for ﬁrms
incorporated in Delaware has held relatively steady since the mid-1990s,
while that of the average non-Delaware charter has grown precipitously. In
the early 1990s, a typical non-Delaware charter was 20% shorter than that of
a typical Delaware-based corporation. Over the last three decades, this gap
has not only closed but even been reversed.121

120 See, e.g., 1 J. ROBERT BROWN, JR. & HERBERT B. MAX, Form 1.01: Articles of Incorporation (Legal
Minimum), in RAISING CAPITAL: PRIVATE PLACEMENT FORMS & TECHNIQUES 1-17, 1-17 (3d ed. 1995).
121 In Figure 2, we report the mean based on the length of all full charters in the dataset for
active companies at a given point in time. This implies that the sample of companies (both in
Delaware and elsewhere) changes over time. However, the results reported above remain substantially
similar when we restrict the sample to companies that appear in the full panel of the dataset.
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Figure 3: Mean Flesch-Kincaid Readability Scores (Full Restatements)

Another constructive measure of our charters corpus explores their overall
readability. To what extent can a layperson read and understand the content
of this foundational governance document? To get a handle on this question,
we assessed our corpus of charters against the well-known Flesch-Kincaid (FK) scale.122 Originally developed by the U.S. military to assess the content of
mechanical instructional manuals, F-K scores are calculated on the basis of
the average length of words and sentences in a document. The score proxies
proportionally to readability, so that the higher the score of a document, the
easier it is to read. F-K scores below a score of 10.0 are considered to be the
most challenging, appropriate to a professional trained in the ﬁeld. (Obvious
candidate groups here might be lawyers, board members, and executives.)123
For the most part, as Figure 3 suggests, the charters in our corpus are not
breezy page-turners. In fact, corporate charters in Delaware in particular have
always been within the hardest tranche of the F-K scale. Perhaps more
interesting is the fact that much like with length, non-Delaware charters in

122 See generally J. PETER KINCAID, ROBERT P. FISHBURNE, JR., RICHARD L. ROGERS & BRAD
S. CHISSOM, NAVAL TECH. TRAINING COMMAND, DERIVATION OF NEW READABILITY FORMULAS
(AUTOMATED READABILITY INDEX, FOG COUNT AND FLESCH READING EASE FORMULA) FOR
NAVY ENLISTED PERSONNEL (1975), https://stars.library.ucf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1055&context=istlibrary [https://perma.cc/QX85-6YSV].
123 For more detail on the F-K scores, see Online Appendix C.
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our dataset have been closing the readability gap, too. One potential
explanation is more heavy “lawyering” of public company governance
documents during the 1990s and early 2000s—a time period coinciding
precisely with the rise of quantitative governance research and enhanced
shareholder activism.
Although we will circle back to explore several of these (and other) textual
attributes of our corpus later in this article, it warrants noting that this is the
ﬁrst time (to our knowledge) metrics like these have even been possible on a
widespread panel of corporate charters.124 That observation alone
underscores the great potential of the CCG as a tool to unlock empirical
governance along untold dimensions.
B. Data Labels
Notwithstanding the several interesting acontextual measures of our
corpus, signiﬁcant additional work is required to distill the substantive legal
content from the textual contents of documents (a process that is often
referred to as “labeling” the corpus). Here, there is no substitute for reading
the documents and deploying lawyerly judgment (an exercise that lawyers do
quite well). Thus, in a parallel eﬀort to the harvesting and cleaning of the raw
charter corpus, we also develop two related labeled datasets.125 The ﬁrst (and
most painstaking to produce) involves manually labeling the content of the
harvested charters along several dimensions.126 We developed a detailed
common rubric that requires a variety of quantitative and textual inputs. The
ﬁrst few of these inputs relate to document “meta-data” (such as execution
date, company identiﬁers, state of incorporation, and whether the document
was a full restatement or a partial amendment). The remaining pertain to
substantive governance choices as reﬂected in the text of the charter. Our
rubric requires the coder to read, identify, label, and extract relevant language
from the charter pertaining to 28 governance provisions in each chartering

124 Nili and Hwang, for instance, used this technique to analyze audit committee charters. See
Nili & Hwang, supra note 91, at 1110.
125 The term “labeled” refers to using human judgment to rank, classify, or assess the content
of a text (or portion thereof). See, e.g., Shuzi Niu, Jiafeng Guo, Yanyan Lan & Xueqi Cheng, Top-k
Learning to Rank: Labeling, Ranking and Evaluation, in SIGIR ‘12: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 35TH
INTERNATIONAL ACM SIGIR CONFERENCE ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN
INFORMATION RETRIEVAL 751, 751-52 (2012). Nearly all existing corporate governance databases
are themselves labeled databases. The CCG, in contrast, includes both unlabeled content (the raw
corpus) and labeled content (described herein).
126 We take some care to elucidate these steps here for the sake of future researchers who will
use this database, and in light of the relatively opaque documentation that attends other corporate
governance datasets. See supra Part 1.
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document.127 We took great care in both designing uniform labeling protocols
and training our research team. We double- and triple-assigned identical
labeling tasks to our less-experienced coders to detect and redress labeling
inconsistencies. Senior members of the team also acted as supervisors to
adjudicate diﬀerences in coding styles and to ﬂag challenging issues with the
entire team in weekly progress meetings.128
Second, we supplement the firm-level observations with a state-level
labeled dataset tracking sixteen statutory governance rules129 across all ﬁfty
states (and the District of Columbia) from 1990 to 2019. Here, the thenprevailing statutory mandates are labeled not only for their substantive
content, but also whether companies are permitted to opt out of the statute,
what sort of measures are required to eﬀectuate an opt-out, and whether
companies opting out are required to choose from a constrained set of
options.130 In all cases, state law provisions were labeled by either the authors
or advanced law students under the direct supervision of the authors.
When combined with the textual corpus, the associated labeled datasets
allow us to track dozens of governance characteristics, across companies and
over time. Although space constraints prevent us from highlighting every
single facet here, we highlight a few interesting trends in the four panels of
Figure 4. Each panel of the ﬁgure tracks the extent to which charters in our
corpus reﬂect one of four diﬀerent types of governance provisions: (i)
multiple classes of common stock; (ii) staggered boards; (iii) prohibitions on
shareholder action by written consent; and (iv) prohibitions on special
meetings. In the latter three categories, we also track the substantive
background content of the relevant state law provision(s) for each issuer
(based on the substantive content of the then-prevailing statute for the state
of incorporation). The interaction between state law and our charter coding
is important, since state law may provide these governance provisions even if
they are not speciﬁcally elected in the charter.

127 Many of these pieces of information later made it possible to match our documents to issuer
information from external datasets, as demonstrated below. A description of our labeling protocol
is included in Appendix B.
128 We used a formal organizational hierarchy similar to the one employed for charter
harvesting. See infra Appendix B.
129 Id.
130 See supra Figure 1 and related text.
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Figure 4: Mean Governance Characteristics of Charters and State Statutes131

Consider ﬁrst multi-class (or dual-class) common stock provisions. These
provisions allow founders to maintain control of their companies even after
their equity stake is diluted and are a hot topic of debate among investors and
governance experts.132 Charters are required to spell out the capital structure
of the corporation, and the provision for multiple classes of common stock is
easily tracked. Issuers with multi-class common stock oscillate somewhat over
131 Although three of the panels in the Figure reﬂect the substantive state background rule,
statutory heterogeneity precludes illustrating other dimensions of the background rule, such as
whether it is a default or immutable rule, what type of document (if any) is required to opt out, and
what a company’s opt-out choices are. These considerations, however, will come into play in the next
subsection, when we use our database to assess (and correct) the contents of existing governance
datasets, such as the IRRC.
132 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class
Stock, 103 VA. L. REV. 585, 585-86 (2017) (reviewing prior literature highlighting the costs of dualclass stock and making the case against perpetual dual-class shares); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi
Kastiel, The Perils of Small-Minority Controllers, 107 GEO. L.J. 1453, 1453 (2019) (investigating dualclass companies where controllers hold a small minority of the company’s equity capital); Daniel R.
Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class Common Stock, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 119,
136-39 (1987) (arguing that dual-class stock facilitates long-term planning); Zohar Goshen & Assaf
Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 YALE L.J. 560, 566-67 (2016) (arguing that
dual-class stock could be value enhancing); John C. Coﬀee, Jr., Dual Class Stock: The Shades of Sunset,
THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Nov. 19, 2018), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2018/11/19/dualclass-stock-the-shades-of-sunset [https://perma.cc/BNE7-2H88] (describing academics and
practitioners as “polarized” over dual-class structures).
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our sampling period, rising continuously to a peak at just under 16% in 2001
and generally declining thereafter. Although not pictured here, it also bears
noting that when multiple classes of common stock are authorized in the
charter within our sample, it is overwhelmingly likely that they will not carry
equal voting rights and privileges on a per-share basis across the board.
Around 78% of the issuers with multi-class common stock in our sample each
year articulate unequal per-share voting rights, a ratio that remains roughly
constant over time.
Moving to the second panel, consider staggered board composition—a
structure that typically designates three overlapping classes of directors
whose terms interlace (much like the U.S. Senate), so that only one third of
the directors are up for reelection in any given year. Staggered boards are
typically considered to be a key way to delay or deter a hostile takeover or
proxy contest.133 Express provisions in the charter that stagger the board are
common in our data, and we ﬁnd them in around 45% of our charters overall.
That said, the frequency of charter-authorized board staggering provisions
has declined discernibly over the last several years, and by 2019 they were a
clear minority (around 39%). This trend is no doubt due to the significant
pressure that proxy advisers and other shareholder watchdogs have placed
on board staggering provisions in recent years.134 Additionally, the
background law of four states require (or at some point required) staggering
of public companies,135 and about 3% of our firms (in an average year) are
incorporated in such states.
A topic of growing importance in contemporary governance debates is the
extent to which shareholders enjoy signiﬁcant latitude to engage (or be
engaged) in activism, via written consent rights or the ability to call special
meetings.136 Each of these rights substantially tips the balance of power and
control away from the board and towards the hands of shareholders. Such
governance devices are reﬂected in the third and fourth panels of the Figure.
With respect to written consent rights, our charters manifest a growing
proclivity to either prohibit such actions outright or to eﬀectively do so by
imposing a requirement that all shareholders entitled to vote must act
unanimously via written consent (a functional impossibility for public
See Gompers et al., supra note 6, at 146-47.
See, e.g., ISS and Glass Lewis Issue Policy Updates for the 2020 Proxy Season, FENWICK (Nov.
20, 2019), https://www.fenwick.com/insights/publications/iss-and-glass-lewis-issue-policy-updatesfor-the-2020-proxy-season [https://perma.cc/QGQ5-W232].
135 IOWA CODE § 490.806A (2021); IND. CODE § 23-1-33-6(c) (2021); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
156B, § 50A, ch. 156D, § 8.06(b)–(g) (2020); OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1027(D)(2) (repealed 2013).
136 See generally Gompers et al., supra note 6, at 150; Holly J. Gregory, John P. Kelsh & Rebecca
Grapsas, ISS and Glass Lewis Issue Policy Updates for the 2019 Proxy Season, HARV. LAW SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE (Dec. 18, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/12/18/iss-and-glasslewis-policy-updates-for-the-2019-proxy-season [https://perma.cc/833K-5YB2].
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companies). The bottom left panel lumps these two effective prohibitions
together, and it shows that effective prohibitions on written consents are
expressly provided for in about 16% of our charters overall. That fraction,
however, has been growing dramatically, from next to nothing at the beginning
of our sample to fully a third of issuers by the end. In addition, about a third
of the issuers in our sample are subject to state laws that effectively prohibit
written consent actions (all by imposing a unanimity requirement).137
Now consider provisions that prohibit shareholders from forcing the
convening of special meetings. Here we once again see a clear increasing trend
toward express prohibition through charter provisions over time, growing
from near zero to around one-ﬁfth of the charters by the end of our sample
period. However, in those cases explicitly granting shareholders a right to
convene a special meeting, the mean triggering percentage is around 33% on
average (and has been falling since the 1990s). In addition, the state law of
several states does not grant shareholders the right by default to convene
special meetings, and such statutes aﬀected about 70% of our ﬁrms (a number
that includes Delaware corporations—at nearly three-ﬁfths of our sample).138
It is important to keep in mind that the interplay between state law and
private ordering can sometimes be subtle in ways not fully captured in Figure
4. As we noted earlier, corporate governance documents can (and frequently
do) attempt to opt out of the background state rule, which can (and frequently
does) give way if the opt-out is executed appropriately. It is critical to keep
track of all of these factors in assessing whether a particular governance device
137 ALA. CODE § 10A-2A-7.04 (2020); ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.423 (2021); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 10-704 (2019); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-26-710 (2021); CAL. CORP. CODE § 603 (2021); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 7-107-104 (2021); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-698 (2021); D.C. CODE § 29-305.04 (2021);
FLA. STAT. § 607.0704 (2020); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-704 (2021); HAW. REV. STAT. § 414-124
(2020); IDAHO CODE § 30-29-704 (2021); IND. CODE § 23-1-29-4 (2021); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 271B.7-040 (West 2017); LA. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-704 (2021); ME. STAT. tit. 13-C, § 704 (2020); MD.
CODE ANN., Corps. & Ass’ns § 2-505 (LexisNexis 2021); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156D, § 7.04
(2020); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.1407 (2021); MINN. STAT. § 302A.441 (2020); MISS. CODE.
ANN. § 79-4-7.04 (2021); MO. REV. STAT. § 351.273 (2021); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-14-704 (2019);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-256 (2020); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:7.04 (2021); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 14A:5-6 (West 2021); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-18-8 (2021); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 615 (McKinney
2020); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-04 (2021); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-75 (2021); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1701.54 (LexisNexis 2021); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.211 (2019); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2524
(2021); 7 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.2-707 (2021); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-7-104 (2021); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 47-1A-704 (2021); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-17-104 (2020); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN.
§ 6.201-202 (West 2021); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-704 (LexisNexis 2021); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
11A, § 7.04 (2021); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-657 (2021); WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.07.040 (2020); W.
VA. CODE § 31D-7-704 (2021); WIS. STAT. § 180.0704 (2021); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-704 (2020).
138 ALA. CODE § 10A-2A-7.02 (2020); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (2020); IND. CODE § 231-29-2 (2021); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6501 (2019); MO. REV. STAT. § 351.225 (2021); N.Y. BUS.
CORP. LAW § 602 (McKinney 2020); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-02 (2021); OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1056
(2021); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.204 (2019); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2521 (2021); 7 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 71.2-701 (2021); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-7-102 (2021); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-655 (2021).
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is present (or absent) in a company in any given observation year. For
example, state law aﬀects whether board staggering is already the
presumptive rule in the jurisdiction. And state law similarly dictates whether
opting out is possible, and if so, whether opting out must be done via the
charter, or instead could be done in a lower-level document (shareholder
approved bylaws, ordinary bylaws, board resolutions, and the like). And for
those companies that opt out, state law may further constrain the number of
overlapping classes of directors that are permitted when a ﬁrm opts out (often
a maximum of three). The panels of Figure 4 account for only charter
contents and background state rule as self-contained matters, with none of
the additional interplay. In later sections, however, we take pains to carry
through this interplay when we compare the CCG database to other existing
corporate governance data.
C. Reassessing What We Know (or Thought We Knew) about Corporate
Governance
The CCG database—including both the raw corpus and the labeled
datasets—gives us a powerful set of new tools to analyze governance
characteristics at the ﬁrm level. This ability, in turn, also makes it possible to
tabulate side-by-side comparisons of the CCG database with other oft-used
governance metrics. One that merits particular attention—and the most
renowned source of ﬁrm-level corporate governance metrics in the law and
ﬁnance literature—is the “ISS Legacy” (aka IRRC) database, discussed at
length in Section I.B.139 In the pages that follow, we set about comparing the
CCG database to the individual items in the IRRC, in order to assess their
accuracy. At the risk of issuing an academic spoiler alert, the results of this
exercise reveal that our worst fears about data integrity have come to pass: as
explained below, we uncover an alarming pattern of miscodes in numerous of
the governance dimensions that comprise the G-Index (and its variations).
The errors are so widespread, in fact, that even under a conservative errordetection protocol, we estimate that the G-Index is coded incorrectly more than 80%
of the time.
But before going there, it is instructive ﬁrst to illustrate with a speciﬁc
example how we assess and classify potential errors: director exculpation
provisions, one of the 24 variables included in the G-Index. Lawyers,
professors, and corporate law students know these provisions well. In all
states that permit or imply them (and by 2003 all did), an exculpation
provision shields directors (and in some cases oﬃcers) from monetary
liability for breaching their ﬁduciary duty of care. Such statutes do not
139

See supra notes 74–85 and accompanying text.
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typically deny injunctive relief, nor do they permit exculpation for conduct
that (among other things) would be disloyal, would lack good faith, or would
constitute corporate waste.140 There is nonetheless some substantive variation
among states’ mandates. For example, in ﬁve states, the statutory rule
exculpates directors automatically without needing an implementing charter
provision.141 And two of those states go even further, making director
exculpation immutable.142 Among the states where exculpation remains a
default rule (in either direction), some permit ﬁrms to opt out of the rule via
one or more governance documents that sit at a “lower” echelon than the
charter (such as a bylaw provision).143
As far as we are able to discern, the IRRC database never considered much
(if any) of the statutory heterogeneity described above, ignoring (for
example) whether the state’s background rule already exculpates directors, or
how/whether a ﬁrm might opt out of that mandate. Instead, the IRRC seems
to have limited its labeling attention to a counting exercise based on an
issuer’s corporate governance documents (which we conjecture focused on
corporate charters, though we do not know for sure). Our approach, in
contrast, pays close attention to the interplay between statutory mandates
and governance documents.144
To assess the accuracy of the IRRC against our CCG database, we
entertain alternative strategies for identifying mis-codes, which we deﬁne as
“permissive” and “conservative” strategies. The permissive approach would
140 Delaware’s famous “102(b)(7)” statutory provision provides the most common template.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2020). There, as in the vast majority of other states, exculpation
for a breach of duty of care is not preordained by statute, but instead may be adopted by the
corporation through express exculpation provision if done via the charter. Id. West Virginia was the
last to add an exculpation statute, following this same enabling template in 2002. W. VA. CODE
§ 31D-2-202 (2021). A minority of states have adopted exculpation statutes that diﬀer from
Delaware’s model. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1 (2021) (providing an exculpation provision that
also covers loyalty and good faith).
141 FLA. STAT. § 607.0831 (2020); IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1 (2021); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.138
(2021); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59 (LexisNexis 2021); WIS. STAT. § 180.0828 (2021).
142 See FLA. STAT. § 607.0831 (2020); IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1 (2021).
143 These include Pennsylvania, 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 513 (2021) (shareholder-promulgated
bylaw); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. § 302A.111 (2020) (bylaw); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.59 (LexisNexis 2021) (bylaw/regulation); and Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-841
(LexisNexis 2021) (bylaw and/or shareholder-promulgated resolution).
144 To put a ﬁner point on it, a corporation’s directors may enjoy exculpation protection in one
of multiple scenarios: (1) the state’s background rule already prescribes exculpation subject to an
immutable rule; (2) the state’s background rule prescribes exculpation as a default rule, and the
corporation has not attempted to opt out using statutorily prescribed means; or (3) the state’s statute
prescribes a default rule that does not prescribe exculpation, but allows the corporation to contract
out pursuant to a statutorily prescribed means and the corporation has done so. The IRRC database
does not appear to have used any of these criteria, but instead uses a less-speciﬁc version of criterion
(3) with no attention to the statutory background requirements. Our approach, in contrast, marshals
all three steps described above.
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simply ask whether there is an inconsistency between what we observe in a
company’s charter and what is contained in the IRRC. Under this approach,
any inconsistencies are deemed to be errors by the IRRC. The conservative
approach, in contrast, identiﬁes an inconsistency as a miscode only if it is
impossible (in light of charter text and the underlying statutory framework)
for the IRRC’s designation to be correct as a legal matter.
To see how these criteria work in practice, consider again the exculpation
example. Suppose ABC Inc. is a Delaware corporation whose 2006 charter
comprises part of our dataset. Suppose further the IRRC represents that the
company exculpated directors in 2006, but our corpus does not reﬂect any
such provision in the charter for that year. The permissive approach would
immediately deem this inconsistency to be a miscode. The conservative
approach would require more steps, taking account of the fact that, as of 2006:
(a) Delaware law did not grant default exculpation to directors; (b) Delaware
did allow opt-outs through an exculpation provision; and (c) any attempt to
opt out must have been reﬂected in the charter to have legal eﬀect. Applying
these criteria, the conservative approach would also register an error: the lack
of an express exculpation term in ABC’s 2006 charter, combined with the
contours of Delaware law as of 2006, necessarily imply that the IRRC label
could not possibly be correct.145
The two panels of Figure 5 compare the IRRC’s exculpation designation
to the CCG dataset over time under each of these two aforementioned
approaches. The left panel compares the IRRC designations for all issuers by
year (bars) against all issuers of the CCG dataset (lines). The red line
corresponds to the permissive approach, tracking the mean number of issuers
per year that have an express exculpation provision in the company charter.
The blue line tracks the conservative approach, factoring in the statutory
regime of each ﬁrm’s state of incorporation as well. The right panel renders a
similar comparison, but it conﬁnes attention to only the set of companies
where we have a positive match between the CCG and IRRC datasets (a
limitation that drops all but the observation years covered by the IRRC,
scattered sporadically between 1990 and 2006).

145 Notice that our conservative error-detection protocol might reach a diﬀerent outcome from
the permissive one if ABC were incorporated in a diﬀerent state—such as Ohio—which allows
corporations to opt out through a lower “echelon” document (i.e., a bylaw provision). In this case, if
the IRRC reﬂects exculpation but we do not observe such a provision in the charter, we cannot deem
a miscode to have occurred under the conservative rubric, since it is at least possible that the ﬁrm
executed its exculpation regime through a bylaw provision (which our chartering corpus and labels
do not track).

2021]

Cleaning Corporate Governance

37

Figure 5: CCG–IRRC Comparison of Director Exculpation Provisions

As one can see from the CCG trendlines—and consistent with the
longstanding view of judges and practitioners146—exculpation provisions
have grown close to ubiquitous, and they were already on a strong growth
trajectory by 1990, shortly after Delaware began by statutory change to allow
them in 1986.147 By 2006, around 85% of all issuers (and 96% of Delaware
corporations) had such provisions in their charters. In contrast, and for
reasons that would likely befuddle most corporate lawyers, the IRRC data
suggest a strong opposite trend, implying that only 27% of all issuers (and
32% of Delaware corporations) exculpated directors by 2006. This striking
divergence is present in both the unmatched and matched subsamples, and it
persists even if we ignore state law superstructures, limiting our attention to
express provisions in the charter.148 Note further that the IRRC’s miscoding
problem appears to grow worse (not better) in time. Lacking a helpful
description of the IRRC’s labeling protocols, we can only speculate why the
dataset appears so alarmingly inaccurate on exculpation. One possibility—
consistent with machine learning text analysis we describe in the next Part—
is that drafting protocols for charter provisions likely became more “lawyerly”
and technical during much of the early 2000s—a transition that may have
caused readers with limited legal training to overlook exculpation terms that
featured technical language.

146 See Randy J. Holland, Delaware Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: The Focus on Loyalty, 11 U. PA. J.
BUS. L. 675, 692 (2009) (noting that after the enactment of section 102(b)(7), almost all Delaware
corporations approved charter amendments with exculpatory provisions towards directors).
147 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (2020).
148 Tabulating at the company level, the IRRC misclassiﬁes exculpation rights 51% of the time
using the permissive approach and 52% of the time using the conservative approach. Note that the
conservative approach yields a higher error rate (at least on this dimension), because by construction
it takes into account state-level statutory provisions—which IRRC appears to ignore completely.
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D. Aggregating G-Index Errors
Director exculpation provisions are but one example of seventeen
individual governance characteristics on which the CCG enables us to audit
the accuracy of the current version of the IRRC database (including the GIndex as contained therein). For all component variables in the IRRC that we
are able to assess through charters, we conducted a similar set of comparisons
to our labeled dataset (using the “conservative” error correction approach
described above). The results of this comparison are captured in Table 1. To
simplify, the Table reports error rates using the permissive rubric, and it
deﬁnes a provision to be a “Positive” when the IRRC reﬂects it to be present
and a “Negative” otherwise. If the IRRC coding matches our charter coding
in the CCG database, we further deem the IRRC coding to be “True” and
otherwise “False”. The table thus tracks “True Positive” (True Negative)
designations—where our data and the IRRC agree about the presence
(absence) of a provision—as well as “False Positive” (False Negative)
designations, in which the IRRC indicates a provision to be present (absent)
and our labeled data reveal the opposite. The table then lays out correct
classiﬁcation rates, error rates, and F1 scores (a conventional way to assess
classiﬁcation accuracy balancing false positives and false negatives149).
Because of lack of documentation on deﬁnitions in the IRRC data, the
Table deﬁnes certain features according to multiple criteria. We found that
blank check preferred stock could fall into one of several categories. We also
found that supermajority charter amendment provisions could be construed
narrowly (only if they pertain to the entire charter) or broadly (also if they
pertain to the whole charter or enumerated portions of the charter). Note
from the table that while some of the metrics are relatively sound, others are
particularly problematic. Averaging across all listed dimensions, our data
suggest that the IRRC data err at least 20% of the time.

149 The F1 designates the harmonic mean between “precision” (the fraction of true positives to
all classified positives) and “recall” (the fraction of true positives to all actual positives). The score is
bounded between 0 and 1, with higher scores suggesting a more accurate classiﬁcation. F1 is a
commonly used metric in text analysis and binary classiﬁcation. For additional discussion of F1
scores, see Pozen et al., supra note 16, at 33.
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Table 1: Inconsistencies Between the IRRC and CCG Data Labels

Unequal Vote
Merger Supermajority
Written Consent
Special Meeting
Lim Amend Chtr (whole + part)
Lim Amend Chtr (whole)
Dual Class
Director Liability Waiver (DoC)
Director Indemnification
Cumulative Voting
Classified Board
Blank Check (Simple)
Blank Check (Any)
State Law: Return of Profits
State Law: Fair Price
State Law: Director Duties
State Law: Cont. Share Acq.
State Law: Cash-Out
State Law: Business Comb.

True +
0.45%
14.16%
19.29%
28.78%
2.56%
0.87%
10.36%
38.08%
6.63%
4.52%
45.70%
86.39%
50.08%
14.32%
30.72%
4.03%
26.94%
3.21%
89.68%

True 98.60%
54.73%
33.81%
6.80%
35.96%
93.60%
85.04%
11.30%
54.68%
86.94%
37.54%
8.23%
11.07%
82.91%
65.82%
71.23%
71.28%
96.58%
8.61%

False +
0.82%
2.64%
18.40%
11.59%
0.49%
2.18%
0.80%
6.30%
20.84%
7.22%
14.05%
3.24%
37.61%
0.90%
2.85%
0.34%
1.12%
0.04%
0.99%

False - Correct %
0.14% 99.05%
28.47% 68.89%
28.50% 53.10%
52.83% 35.58%
61.00% 38.51%
3.36% 94.46%
3.80% 95.40%
44.32% 49.39%
17.86% 61.30%
1.32% 91.46%
2.71% 83.24%
2.13% 94.62%
1.24% 61.15%
1.87% 97.23%
0.61% 96.54%
24.40% 75.26%
0.66% 98.22%
0.18% 99.79%
0.72% 98.29%

Error %
0.95%
31.11%
46.90%
64.42%
61.49%
5.54%
4.60%
50.61%
38.70%
8.54%
16.76%
5.38%
38.85%
2.77%
3.46%
24.74%
1.78%
0.21%
1.71%

F1
0.49
0.48
0.45
0.47
0.08
0.24
0.82
0.60
0.26
0.51
0.85
0.97
0.72
0.91
0.95
0.25
0.97
0.97
0.99

These all seem like relatively large overall error rates. What does it imply
for the G-Index, which amalgamates all of them? As discussed earlier, the GIndex has become easily the most prominent corporate governance index in
the literature, spawning a litany of variations.150 And since the index is
computed by summing the several indicator variables in the IRRC database,
we are also in a unique position to use our labeled dataset to reevaluate the
G-Index, correcting it on an item-by-item basis in situations where we found
evidence of a clear miscode.
To implement our corrections, we reiterate that we utilized the
conservative approach described above to detect and then correct miscodes.
For each ﬁrm observed in each year of the IRRC, we began with the value of
the G-Index as reported in the IRRC dataset. For the issuers we could match,
we moved incrementally through the binary governance variables one at a
time, determining (per the conservative approach) whether there was an
unmistakable coding error in the IRRC. If none was found, we moved onto the
next variable. If there was an unmistakable coding error, we manually
corrected the value of the index by one point upwards or downwards
(depending on the variable). We repeated this process ad seriatim for all
matched issuers and all years in the IRRC database until we had exhausted
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See supra notes 38–44 and accompanying text.
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the list of labeled variables tracked in the CCG data that corresponded to
elements of the G-Index.151
By way of illustration, recall that in our director exculpation example
above, it became clear that the IRRC erroneously indicated that ABC Inc.
had exculpated directors when in fact it had not. Because the existence of an
exculpation provision would ordinarily imply an increase in the ﬁrm’s GIndex during that year, it follows that the G-Index for ABC must have been
erroneously increased by one, reﬂecting this faulty exculpation designation.
Our protocol corrected that mistake, reducing the G-Index of the ﬁrm in that
year by one point. A similar process—crossing charter contents and state
law—applies to all other analogous variables comprising the index.152
We reiterate that we take care to make these adjustments only when there
is a clear error in the IRRC, as per the conservative approach. Thus, in some
cases where our labeled datasets and the IRRC conﬂict, we might still refrain
from making an adjustment, because we cannot satisfy the clear error
standard. We thus give the IRRC the beneﬁt of the doubt even in cases where
we have grounds to suspect a coding error.
Consider first our assessment of errors along a very simple metric: for
those firms and years where a comparison was possible, how frequently was
the reported G-Index score incorrect? As illustrated in Table 2, the answer
is alarming. Averaging over all years and all matched companies, we find the
G-Index to be inaccurate over four-fifths of the time (82.95%). More
disconcertingly, as with director exculpation, we find the incidence of error
grows in magnitude over time (from 73.68% in 1990 to 88.58% in 2006), even
as the database was generating increased attention among academics,
regulators and practitioners.
We emphasize that this error rate is almost certainly a lower bound, since
we deployed the conservative error correction rubric, intervening only for
unambiguous errors; we made no corrections to probable errors when it was
still possible that the IRRC reﬂected a provision not in our corpus (such as
bylaws, contracts, and so forth). The estimated error rate also errs on the
conservative side because our labels do not track every single one of the
elements that comprise the index. Notwithstanding these constraints that
bias our miscoding estimates downward, this is a distressing error rate for a
core dataset that has long been the very foundation of empirical corporate
governance research.

151 When we were unable to match an IRRC ﬁrm to the CCG, we left the G-Index intact. We
exclude these unmatched ﬁrms in the discussion that immediately follows, but we include them in
several of our replications of the GIM results in the subsequent subsection as a sensitivity analysis.
152 A description of our protocol is included in Appendix B.
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Table 2: G-Index Coding Error Incidence, by Year (Matched Issuers)

Of course, the mere existence of an error in the index may not be fatal if
its magnitude constitutes something akin to rounding error. In other words,
if the overall size of the observation error remains modest, perhaps the noise
detected above might not be too troubling.153 Our data permit analysis here
as well, and we also ﬁnd substantial cause for concern. The histogram in
Figure 6 below demonstrates the overall magnitudes of the G-Index errata
(even with our conservative rubric for correction). It exhibits considerable
variation in our matched ﬁrms, with an overall standard deviation of 1.83.
Relative to the variability of the G-Index as a whole (whose standard
deviation is 2.71),154 that is a distressing noise to signal ratio.
The aggregated errors we detect using the CCG database not only
introduce considerable noise, but also a discernible bias.155 Speciﬁcally, our
corrections reveal an additional downward bias in the G-Index of around
-0.75 points overall, one that grows worse (not better) over time, as the righthand panel of Figure 6 illustrates. By 2006, even under our conservative recoding protocol, the G-Index retains roughly the same degree of
measurement error variability, but compounds it with a downward bias of
nearly 2 points.
153 We allow for this possibility with a scholarly grain of salt, given the 80%+ error rate reported
in the text. Indeed, given this error rate, the best-case scenario for salvaging the G-Index against
the woes of measurement error would be if it were exactly right 20% of the time, too low by one
point 40% of the time, and too high by one point the remaining 40%. In that case, the overall index
would be unbiased on average, but the errors would still have a standard deviation of around 0.9,
fully one-third the size of the standard deviation in the G-Index itself (of 2.71 in our matched data).
154 As noted above, the standard deviation of the G-Index for our matched-company years is
also 2.71, suggesting that our matching protocol rendered a representative set of matches.
155 We compute bias by computing the mean diﬀerence (by year) between the G-Index and
the CCG-Index. If there is noise and no bias, that mean diﬀerence would hover around zero. But it
does not, as the discussion in the text elucidates.
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Figure 6: Miscode Error Magnitudes and CCG Corrections to G-Index

At the risk of some overkill, we emphasize once again that our errorcorrection approach errs strongly on the side of conservatism in several ways.
First, we reassessed only 17 of the 24 criteria in the GIM database that are
conﬁrmable from our charter texts and labeled datasets. Moreover, we
avoided hazarding a guess (even an educated one) on whether various
dimensions were likely miscoded, and we only corrected those inputs that we
could be certain were erroneous, leaving in place designations where we could
not identify an error with certainty.
It warrants noting that our choice to highlight ﬂaws in the G-Index and
IRRC speciﬁcally is strictly a matter of authorial choice, warranted (in our
view) by the index’s prominence in the literature and its centrality to
appreciable follow-on research (such as the E-Index, O-Index, and D-index
to name a few).156 That said, we are by no means limited to this particular
single comparison: the CCG can easily be recruited into a quantitative battle
of the bands with other well-known governance databases. In Online
Appendix C, for example, we show how the CCG stacks up against a diﬀerent
source: the contemporary ISS governance database (2007–present)—one that
itself has attracted considerable academic attention (but contains insuﬃcient
data to reassemble the G-Index). There, we also ﬁnd a disconcerting pattern
of misclassiﬁcation rates, comparable to those illustrated above, reinforcing
our concerns about data integrity and accuracy.
E. The Arbitrage Value of Good Governance Revisited
Having shown that the CCG dataset exposes disconcerting errors in
popular corporate governance indices, an immediate next question concerns
assessing what that implies for the ﬁeld more broadly. As noted above, scores
156

See supra notes 45–52 and accompanying text.
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of “folk wisdoms” from empirical corporate governance were generated from
these data, many of which are now among the most well-known in the ﬁeld.
Do they hold up?
Testing all the implications would take more time, space, and reader
patience than is achievable here, but for the sake of illustration, we return
once again to the G-Index, using our CCG corpus to reassess one of the most
famous empirical ﬁndings in all of law and ﬁnance, from GIM.157 As noted
above, their seminal examination introduced the G-Index, for the ﬁrst time
peering into granular, ﬁrm-speciﬁc governance practices and linking them to
various ﬁnancial performance metrics. Perhaps the most famous ﬁnding was
that “good governance” is also an arbitrage opportunity. More precisely, GIM
showed that a “long-short” investment strategy of buying “democratic” ﬁrms
(in the lowest decile of the G-Index) and short-selling “dictatorial” ﬁrms (in
the highest decile) would systematically outperform the market by 71 basis
points per month (the equivalent of an astonishing 8.9% per year).158 This
ﬁnding was (and remains) a striking result, a serviceable cocktail party table
topic, and a veritable modern-day slogan that informs policy and academic
debates in corporate governance the world over.159
A now-obvious red ﬂag, however, is that the result depends critically on
the contents of the IRRC database—the very same resource that we showed
to be alarmingly inaccurate. Might this inaccuracy have infected their
ultimate results (not to mention the hundreds of scholarly contributions that
followed after)?
The answer is not clear on a priori grounds. On the one hand, the GIM
results could grow even stronger once the miscodes are rectiﬁed: This is what
one might ordinarily expect when an independent variable (like G-Index) is
muddled by random observation error.160 In that case, cleaner data would be
expected to sharpen and amplify the original results. On the other hand, data
inﬁrmities can sometimes be the root cause of an evident statistical result,
Gompers et al., supra note 6.
See supra text accompanying note 42. For those keeping score, a basis point is simply 1/100 of a
percentage point, and thus conversion into an excess return is given by (1+0.0071)12 - 1 = 0.089, or 8.9%.
159 See supra notes 45–60 and accompanying text.
160 This eﬀect is sometimes referred to as “classical” measurement error, and it represents the
case where the measurement error of a variable is independent of the variable’s “true” value. See
John Bound, Charles Brown & Nancy Mathiowetz, Measurement Error in Survey Data, in 5
HANDBOOK OF ECONOMETRICS 3705, 3707 (James J. Heckman & Edward Leamer eds., 2001)
(“Most discussions of measurement error are based on the ‘classical’ assumption that errors in
measuring a particular variable are uncorrelated with the true value of that variable, the true values
of other variables in the model, and any errors in measuring those variables.”); Darren Lubotsky &
Martin Wittenberg, Interpretation of Regressions with Multiple Proxies, 88 REV. ECON. & STAT. 549,
550-51 (2006) (explaining the assumptions of classical measurement error); see also Aaron Chalﬁn &
Justin McCrary, Are U.S. Cities Underpoliced? Theory and Evidence, 100 REV. ECON. & STAT. 167,
167-73 (2018) (applying the classical measurement error model).
157
158
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typically when such inﬁrmities are not the artifact of random noise. In this
case, the eﬀect of cleaner data can weaken the results. And for the G-Index
errors, it is not clear a priori which of these stories is most likely to hold.161
To investigate these questions, we set about reanalyzing the GIM
governance-arbitrage result using the CCG data. The fruits of this eﬀort are
contained in Table 3 (which is fashioned after the portion of GIM that reports
on the arbitrage result162). The ﬁrst column of the table simply reproduces
their reported results, with each row associated with an approximate decile of
governance-indexed portfolios, ranging from no greater than 5 (democratic
ﬁrms) to no less than 14 (dictatorial ﬁrms). The estimates reported in the
Table represent the unexplained return (or “Alpha”) generated by an
investment in a value-weighted portfolio drawn from that decile,163 and
consequently taking a “short” position in that portfolio would generate the
same return with the opposite sign. Consequently, the diﬀerence between the
most democratic portfolio’s Alpha and most dictatorial portfolio’s Alpha
represents the unexplained return of the long-short investment described
above. That diﬀerence generates their celebrated 71-basis-point monthly
return. The second column represents our best eﬀort at an exact replication
of GIM’s results with historical data from the IRRC. The remaining columns
represent a re-estimation of their results using our CCG-corrected data
under a variety of approaches.
As one can see from the table, our exact replication (column 2) is nearly
spot on with the original, bolstering conﬁdence that we can, in fact,
substantially replicate GIM’s ﬁndings with their own data.164 The third
column represents our replication using the original GIM dataset, but one
where we substituted the CCG-Index (i.e., the “corrected” G-Index value as
described above) for the reported one whenever we were able to generate a
161 Our best a priori guess would be on the latter, however. Because the G-Index is the
aggregation of two dozen dummy variables, it is a likely candidate for non-classical measurement
error. The most extreme version of this eﬀect is for binary variables (where measurement error can
never be classical by deﬁnition), but this problem aﬄicts bounded discrete variables too. Black et
al., supra note 82, at 743. In fact, it merits observing that the most well-known result in GIM—which
focuses on the two most extreme deciles in the G-Index—is especially likely to exhibit non-classical
measurement error. See Bound et al., supra note 160, at 3724-26.
162 See Gompers et al., supra note 6, at 123 tbl.VI.
163 Speciﬁcally, the reported alpha values corresponded to the constant term of a four-factor
Fama-French-Carhart asset pricing estimation on monthly returns for each decile’s value-weighted
portfolio. By construction, this constant represents the average return that cannot be explained by
conventional asset pricing factors. Id. at 122-23.
164 One potential reason for the slight divergence between our own results and the ones
reported in GIM’s original analysis could be that some of the data used in these calculations
reportedly changed over time. See Pat Akey, Adriana Z. Robertson & Mikhail Simutin, Noisy
Factors (Sept. 24, 2021) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3930228 [https://
perma.cc/H34Z-QWRE].
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correction. It bears noting that during this period of years (1990-1998), we
faced limitations in matching up our dataset, and thus only about 42% of the
GIM ﬁrm-years could be checked and corrected.165 In unmatched issuers,
we simply continued to use their originally reported scores. Even with this
modest correction, however, we estimate a discernible lower unexplained
return to 59 basis points (bps) (representing a one-sixth attenuation from the
original, the equivalent of a reduction in the unexplained annual spread from
8.9% to 7.3%). In the fourth column, we perform a similar analysis, but with
a recently downloaded version of the IRRC database (which appears to have
been modiﬁed slightly in 2010, subsequent to GIM’s original analysis), and
the unexplained return dropped even further to 49.9 bps (representing a
reduction in the unexplained annual spread from 8.9% to 6.2%). Finally, in
the fifth column we returned to the original IRRC dataset and ran our
results with only our matched firms.166 Here, we estimate an unexplained
alpha of 55.9 bps (representing a reduction in the unexplained annual
spread from 8.9% to 6.9%).
All told, our results strongly suggest that not only do the errors in the
G-Index affect results, but that they do so in a disconcerting way. In each
of the reported replications that use our corrected CCG-Index, the
estimated abnormal return grows weaker—exactly the opposite movement
from what one would expect had the G-Index merely been hamstrung by
garden-variety measurement errors. Rather, each replication drives
appreciably downward the estimated extent to which “good governance”
predicts abnormally good returns to investors. Averaging across the
columns, approximately a quarter of the 8.9% premium reported by GIM
dissolves in the presence of corrected data.

165 The main reason for this limitation is that our dataset only allows us to verify the accuracy
of those company-years in the GIM data for which at least one fully restated charter is available on
EDGAR. As EDGAR only went live in the mid-1990s, the coverage of company-years from the
early 1990s remains sparse.
166 We conﬁrmed that the GIM analysis with the uncorrected G-Index data and matched ﬁrms
delivers estimates almost exactly on par with the results reported in the ﬁrst column.
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Table 3: Replication and Robustness of Good Governance as Arbitrage

G ≤ 5 (Democracy)
G = 6
G =7
G = 8
G = 9
G = 10
G = 11
G = 12
G = 13
G ≥ 14 (Dictatorship)

Democracy-Dictatorship (bps)
Attenuation from Original (in %)
Implied Annual Excess Return

Original GIM
0.29*
0.13
0.22
0.18
0.24
0.19
0.08
0.14
-0.02
0.12
0.03
0.11
0.18
0.16
-0.25
0.14
-0.01
0.14
-0.42*
0.19

Exact Replication
(Historical IRRC)
0.26
0.14
0.189
0.19
0.234
0.19
0.017
0.14
-0.066
0.12
0.012
0.11
0.137
0.16
-0.283
0.15
-0.066
0.14
-0.438*
0.18

Replication with
CCG-Corrections
(Historical IRRC)
0.175
0.17
-0.005
0.17
0.161
0.21
0.264
0.16
-0.173
0.13
0.134
0.14
0.043
0.14
-0.167
0.15
-0.09
0.15
-0.415*
0.17

Replication with
CCG-Corrections
(Updated IRRC)
0.118
0.15
-0.082
0.18
0.112
0.19
0.264
0.15
-0.185
0.13
0.154
0.13
0.051
0.14
-0.172
0.16
-0.106
0.14
-0.381*
0.17

Replication With
Matched Firms
(Historical IRRC)
0.334
0.20
-0.021
-0.21
0.285
0.24
0.382
0.19
-0.203
0.16
0.246
0.18
0.142
0.20
-0.253
0.19
-0.195
0.21
-0.225
0.20

71.0
69.8
59.0
49.9
55.9
-1.69%
-16.90%
-29.72%
-21.27%
8.9%
8.7%
7.3%
6.2%
6.9%
Performance attribution regression of Democracy - Dictatorship Portfolios; 1990-1998. The first column
restates the estimates from Table VI of Gompers, Ishii & Metrick ("GIM" 2003). The second column
reports our attempt at an exact replication. The remaining three columns are replication robustness
checks using CCG-corrected data for a variety of comparison samples. Coefficient estimates reflect
unexplained return (a) values from Fama-French four-factor portfolio regressions. Standard Errors in
italics. (* = 0.05 significance; ** = 0.01 significance)

It is worth noting that even with our corrections, the GIM arbitrage result
does not “go away” completely. And accordingly, one could entertain the
possibility that the original result—albeit reliant on imperfectly coded data—
merely generated a result that was still “real” but just a little too rosy. While
we cannot rule out this possibility, we are skeptical. The fact that the
attenuation eﬀect is discernible after correcting only the matched ﬁrm-years
(42%) with a deliberately conservative rubric raises serious concerns that
Table 3 vastly understates the eﬀect of the problem. And, reiterating our
point above, the directionality of the change is particularly concerning, since
it moves counter to what one would expect to see with classical measurement
error adding just mere noise to the eﬀect.
Unpacking and testing these possibilities are beyond the scope of this
paper, so we leave that project to future research (at least for now). And there
may be considerable unpacking left to do: as noted above, a substantial
number of empirical corporate governance contributions of the last two
decades rely on the same data sources as did GIM. At the same time, the
open-source nature of the CCG database means that many scholars can
participate in this enterprise. The above exercise (or something close to it)
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can be used to revisit the results of dozens of well-known empirical corporate
governance results in the literature.167
III. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AS “BIG DATA”
Although the CCG provides a powerful and novel way to reevaluate
several old chestnuts of corporate governance, its primary—and most
exciting—use is prospective. This Part spotlights some of the ways that future
scholars and policymakers can make use of the CCG. In particular, the CCG’s
underlying textual corpus allows for emergent techniques that use machine
learning and computational text analysis.168 We explore some preliminary
ﬁndings of our own using those techniques here. Such techniques, when
applied to the CCG and its underlying corpus, have the potential both to
improve on the accuracy of conventional empirical practices and to broaden
the horizons of corporate governance research.
A. Document-Level Trends
First, the CCG corpus allows us to identify some interesting documentlevel trends. In Part II, we noted that some of the most rudimentary measures
of our charter documents helped show that charters of non-Delaware
companies have become longer and less readable over time, eﬀectively
converging with those of Delaware-incorporated companies. Here, we use
computer processing over our full corpus to explore several other metrics.169
Type-Token Ratios. The “Type-Token Ratio” (TTR) is a common metric
that represents the ratio of unique terms divided by the total number of words
in the document.170 This metric helps researchers understand a document’s
repetitiveness and redundancy.
We illustrate our TTR ﬁndings in Figure 7. The top two panels show the
mean TTR for all charters that were in place in a given year, distinguishing
between Delaware and non-Delaware issuers, and also subdividing between

167 See generally Bebchuk et al., What Matters, supra note 11; Karpoﬀ et al., supra note 11;
Madanoglu & Karadag, supra note 45; Straska & Waller, supra note 10; Harford et al., supra note 49;
Core et al., supra note 11; Adams & Ferreira, supra note 51; Bebchuk et al., Disappearing Association,
supra note 11; Daines et al., supra note 52.
168 See sources cited supra note 16.
169 The use of these techniques requires some preprocessing that is by now pretty standard in
the ﬁeld of computational text analysis. All measures presented below are based on the text of
charters from which we stripped any content other than words as well as so-called stop words. After
that, we used a technique called stemming to avoid treating simple inﬂected variations of words as
diﬀerent words.
170 See, e.g., Paul J. Wahlbeck, James F. Spriggs II & Lee Sigelman, Ghostwriters on the Court?
A Stylistic Analysis of U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Drafts, 30 AM. POL. RSCH. 166, 176 (2002).
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the full restatements only, and the complete set of eﬀective charter documents
in place in a given year (tacking on any partial amendments).171
Our analysis shows that the overall TTR ratios of charters have generally
declined over time under either measure. As was the case for changes in
charter length and readability, most of this change has been outside of
Delaware, with non-Delaware issuers substantially converging with their
Delaware counterparts by the end of our sample. This trend suggests that
much of the growth in length of charters outside Delaware is accompanied by
a greater tendency towards repetitiveness or redundancy.
Syntactic Similarity. Another interesting text analysis measure concerns
inter-document comparisons, which focus on assessing the similarity between
two or more documents. It is unclear what trends to expect here: the increasing
attention on “tailored” corporate governance regimes might lead one to predict
that governance documents have grown less similar to one another over time.
However, because shareholder activists, arbitrageurs, and proxy advisory
firms—among others—have become more sophisticated in recent years, we
might also expect that results lead in the other direction.
One common technique in machine learning of assessing document
similarity is to measure the extent to which a numerical representation of one
document (represented by a mathematical vector) aligns with that of another
document.172 Many anti-plagiarism and e-discovery algorithms use this
approach,173 and it is often captured through a “cosine similarity” statistic that
ranges from 0 (reﬂecting utter dissimilarity) to 1 (reﬂecting complete
similarity). We compute this measure and use a set of plots similar to the
plots in Figure 7 depicting Type-Token Ratios to track it over the span of the
CCG dataset.174 The lower panels in Figure 7 illustrate the mean cosine
similarity of each charter document with other charters from that year that
were among the 25% of the documents most similar to it (its “25% nearest
neighbors”). As shown in the ﬁgure, inter-document similarity has also grown
discernibly during the span of the CCG dataset (both inside and outside of
Delaware), but it has remained uniformly higher in Delaware.175
171 For more details on the treatment of piecemeal amendments within the corpus, see supra
note 117 and infra Appendix B.
172 Jeremy McClane, for example, has used this technique to consider the role of boilerplate in
securities disclosure. Jeremy McClane, Boilerplate and the Impact of Disclosure on Securities Dealmaking,
72 VAND. L. REV. 191, 222-25 (2019).
173 See, e.g., Robin Küppers & Stefan Conrad, A Set-Based Approach to Plagiarism Detection
(2012) (unpublished paper), http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-1178/CLEF2012wn-PAN-KuppersEt2012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/67T6-9UPE].
174 We employed a standard set of computational text analysis transformations before making
these computations. See infra notes 180–181 and accompanying text for greater elaboration.
175 One potential explanation for the growth in similarity is the fact that the numbers of
charters available in the CCG grows over time. However, this eﬀect cannot fully explain the growth
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Figure 7: Mean Type-Token Ratio and 25%-Nearest-Neighbor Cosine
Similarity

Document measures such as these are helpful to explore industry- and
firm-level characteristics. Do these types of measures reflect (or predict)
attributes about the nature of the company’s business, size, and profitability?
Table 4 highlights a variety of document measures across these three slices
of the CCG.
Consider ﬁrst how our corpus breaks down by industry. Here, the content
of corporate charters appears to ﬂuctuate considerably, both across industries
and (in some cases) over time. Panel A reports on the mean of several of the
metrics discussed above, but this time disaggregated across diﬀerent one-digit
SIC176 sectors. Several characteristics stand out. Most notably, issuers in the
Finance sector stand out across all of the aforementioned measures: they are
long (over 8,000 words on average), complex (scoring second lowest in F-K
readability), repetitive (scoring lowest on type-token ratios) and overall, quite
similar (scoring highest in cosine similarity). On the other end of the
in similarity. Most importantly, while the numbers of charters of active companies peaked in 2006,
similarity scores continue increasing after that.
176 The Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation system is used by the government to classify
diﬀerent industry areas. SIC 60, for instance, refers to banks. Guidance: Standard Industrial
Classification of Economic Activities (SIC), GOV.UK (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.gov.uk/government/
publications/standard-industrial-classification-of-economic-activities-sic [https://perma.cc/QL56-4NSR].
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spectrum, the service sector typically has charters that are relatively short,
tailored, easy to read, and (relatively) less emulatory.
Table 4: Charter Content Means, by Industry, Asset Value & Tobin-Q
Categories (Observations at the Firm-Year Level)

Construction
Finance Insurance & RE
Manufacturing
Mining
Retail Trade
Services
Transp Comm Elec
Wholesale Trade
Other
Total

Charter
Length
3,850.11
8,097.73
4,938.61
4,446.61
4,802.60
4,368.52
5,893.04
5,510.26
3,757.52
5,542.00

F-K
Type-Token Cos-Sim
Readability
Ratio
Nearest 25%
9.5264
0.2527
0.3254
12.6549
0.2261
0.3167
13.2327
0.2575
0.3084
13.0641
0.2692
0.3023
14.7207
0.2613
0.3087
15.6347
0.2569
0.3147
10.9905
0.2464
0.2985
13.3965
0.2493
0.3103
16.8329
0.2792
0.3267
13.3120
0.2507
0.3101
Panel A: SIC Industry Group

Quartile 1
Quartile 2
Quartile 3
Quartile 4
Total

3,859.35
3,915.37
4,452.35
6,471.78
5,544.16

18.9441
0.3205
18.9652
0.2842
15.4412
0.2638
11.0583
0.2363
13.3122
0.2506
Panel B: Asset Value Quartile

0.2819
0.2947
0.3076
0.3146
0.3101

Quartile 1
Quartile 2
Quartile 3
Quartile 4
Total

6,926.03
5,815.96
5,137.17
3,984.94
5,398.24

10.3385
0.2397
12.1511
0.2380
13.3775
0.2511
16.5338
0.2742
13.1673
0.2502
Panel C: Tobin's Q Quartile

0.3128
0.3132
0.3106
0.3041
0.3104

Larger companies are generally thought to be more complex, and Panel
B of the Table bears this intuition out, disaggregating the population into
size quartiles according to total asset value (as reported in the issuer’s 10-K
for the year observed). Here, one observes substantial monotone trends as
one moves through the size quartiles: larger firms have longer, less readable,
more repetitive, and more emulatory charters on average than do their
smaller counterparts.
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Panel C does something similar, but here we subdivide companies into
quartiles based on their Tobin’s q value each year, which is thought to measure
the “value added” of the ﬁrm’s operation.177 Here, we once again see a trend
that exhibits substantially the reverse monotonic relationships that we saw with
asset value. As we move into higher Q ratio quartiles, mean charter lengths
decline, readability increases, and redundancy falls. There does not appear to
be a strong trend in inter-document similarity, however.
There is much more one can do with these sorts of measures. But even
with this cursory appraisal, much real economic activity within ﬁrms leaves
footprints in corporate governance documents (or perhaps vice versa). This
observation suggests intriguing possibilities for researchers who wish to track
whether and how a variety of political and economic phenomena (such as
common ownership patterns) interact with the distribution of authority and
control rights in ﬁrms.
B. Latent Semantic Content
A second exciting aspect of the CCG is its potential for unleashing a rich
array of tools from computational textual analysis that allow for deeper
inquiry into document substance and structure.178 Below we report on a few
such applications, relating to legal origins and sectoral eﬀects, and we end by
demonstrating how text analysis helps tell part of the story of the evolution
of an industry during moments of upheaval.
To the legal traditionalist, many of the tools we discuss below may seem
(for want of a better term) un-lawyerly. After all, most of them begin by
taking the texts of admittedly complex and nuanced legal documents,
distilling them into numeric vector representations, and manipulating those
representations to isolate “clusters” of aﬃliated or similar documents. While
such mathematical renderings would seemingly be at odds with traditional
legal analysis, these tools are surprisingly powerful, and many parts of legal
practice have long embraced computational techniques to augment traditional
approaches.179 It is in that spirit that we employ them below.

177 The Table uses the ratio of the issuer’s market value to its book value to measure Tobin’s q.
While not precisely equal to q, the market/book ratio is a widely accepted approximation. See Tim
Adam & Vidhan K. Goyal, The Investment Opportunity Set and Its Proxy Variables, 31 J. FIN. RSCH. 41,
41 (2008) (“[T]he market-to-book assets ratio has the highest information content with respect to
investment opportunities.”).
178 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 16.
179 These include discovery and motion practice, transactional due diligence, and predicting
outcomes of legal disputes. See sources cited supra note 16.
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We transform each of the charters in our corpus into a vector
representation based on the vocabulary used.180 Because our corpus allows us
to observe ﬁrms’ charters multiple times, we develop two alternative
representations, which we refer to as the “snapshot” and the “mashup”
versions. The snapshot treats each year the company is publicly traded as a
single observation, delivering a vector representation of the company’s
charter as it existed on January 1 of that year. Consequently, any company
observed over several years in our dataset will (by deﬁnition) be associated
with several snapshots of its charter. The mashup combines the various
snapshots together into a single composite for the company, taking the mean
values of vector elements for years in which we observe snapshots.181
In many applications (including ours), a vector representation of a
document may have dozens, hundreds, or even thousands of dimensions—far
too many to illustrate graphically. Nevertheless, the dimensions are derived
using a technique designed to ensure that each successive dimension has
diminishing explanatory power.182 Consequently, by limiting attention to just
the ﬁrst two dimensions of our vectorized texts, we can retain the most
important sources of variation while still enabling us to represent the
“location” of each document in two-dimensional space.183 The panels of
Figure 8 do just that for the mashup versions of company charters. Charters
that bear strong similarities to one another are located in close proximity, and
accordingly if there are several mutually similar documents, they will tend to
cluster in tight local neighborhoods; documents that are highly dissimilar, on
the other hand, will be far apart, and several mutually dissimilar documents
will scatter untidily about the plot, exhibiting no obvious clustering pattern.
Even in this low dimensional setting, the panels from Figure 8 show
discernible evidence of clustering—patterns that directly bear on whether
jurisdiction and/or legal origins leave their marks on ﬁrm governance. The
top panel of the Figure utilizes color codings to diﬀerentiate between each
180 More speciﬁcally, each document was distilled into a vector of ones and zeros depending
on whether a word was featured in the document or not, and then rescaled using a familiar termfrequency/inverse-document frequency (tf-idf) transformation. For details, see Frankenreiter &
Livermore, supra note 16, at 43 (explaining these methods) and Talley, supra note 16, at 192-94
(applying these methods).
181 More precisely, the mashup vector for each company consists of the averaged tf-idf scores
across all observed years. There are, of course, other possibilities for combining documents, but we
opted for this because of its ease of use and the fact that the main alternative (appending all years’
charters into a “mega-charter”) might introduce unwanted distortions.
182 For a more detailed explanation, see Talley, supra note 16, at 194-95.
183 To obtain two-dimensional representations, we implement two steps. In the ﬁrst step, we
use singular value composition (SVD) to reduce the number of dimensions to 50. In the second step,
we use the t-SNE algorithm to obtain two-dimensional representations. See Geoﬀrey Hinton &
Sam Roweis, Stochastic Neighbor Embedding, in ADVANCES IN NEURAL INFORMATION PROCESSING
SYSTEMS 15, at 857 (Suzanna Becker, Sebastian Thrun & Klaus Obermayer eds., 2002).
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company’s state of incorporation184 and highlights eight states that are well
represented incorporation homes within our dataset.185
Figure 8: Governance Clustering and State/Legal Origin (in two-dimensional space)

184 We tracked the incorporation date as of the date of ﬁling, thereby picking issuers who
reincorporated out of state. For such issuers, the Figure classiﬁes them by which state they were
incorporated in for the longest amount of time.
185 See Online Appendix D for a state-by-state breakdown.
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Several interesting features of the top panel stand out. First, there appear
to be relatively tight clustering patterns for many states, though this does not
appear to be true categorically. An example of a state whose companies exhibit
tight clustering is California, depicted with the dense colony of magenta dots
on the right side of the panel. The fact that the charters of almost all public
California companies fall into this tight neighborhood suggests that their
charters are very similar to one another, and very dissimilar to the charters of
companies incorporated elsewhere. Maryland, represented by forest green
dots on the top panel, shows an analogous pattern. Maryland has a
considerable share of the incorporation market for real estate investment
trusts, and virtually all of the Maryland issuers in this cluster are, in fact, Real
Estate Investment Trusts (REITs).
California and Maryland’s patterns stand in stark contrast with New York,
represented in dark blue. New York companies are scattered haphazardly with
no strong pattern, suggesting comparably low levels of intra-state similarity.
And, in some ways similar to New York, the dominant majority of Delawareincorporated ﬁrms in our dataset (58% of the observations, depicted as black
dots) also appear to sprawl entropically across all quadrants of the diagram,
indicating substantial governance heterogeneity (at least as measured by the
latent semantic content of chartering documents).
The bottom panel reproduces the identical geographical layout as the top
one, but it color-codes charters diﬀerently, based on the legal origin of the
state’s corporate code. Here we subdivide issuers into three groups: (i) those
incorporated in Delaware (black dots), (ii) those incorporated in states that
adopted the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) (a model business law
that was created by the American Bar Association and adopted by about half
of all states186) in substantial part (red dots), or (iii) those incorporated
neither in Delaware nor in any jurisdictions that embraced the MBCA (gray
dots).187 In contrast to the bottom panel, there appears to be very little
evidence that a common “legal origin” of the state’s corporate statute matters
much for determining or predicting the contents of charters, at least as
measured by whether the state built its law on the basis of the MBCA. Even
the few apparent red clusters in MBCA states appear to be artifacts of intrastate clustering, since those same local neighborhoods are clearly associated
with distinct states, such as Massachusetts and Virginia, in the top panel.
These ﬁgures are consistent with the view that state of incorporation can and
186 Model Business Corporation Act – Enactment Map (as of June 11, 2019) (illustration), in
Corporate Laws Committee, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/
committees/corplaws [https://perma.cc/CW2Q-E2KP].
187 We impute MBCA legal origins from the ﬁfty-state survey produced by USLegal.com. See
State Corporation Laws, USLEGAL, https://corporations.uslegal.com/basics-of-corporations/statecorporation-laws [https://perma.cc/6QYJ-Z9SF].
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often does shape the content of charters, but common statutory origin
appears to have little if any explanatory power.188
Another facet of the textual corpus is related to industry group eﬀects.
Figure 9 once again reproduces the same two-dimensional representations
from Figure 8 above, this time color coding by industry sector (at the onedigit SIC group). Here, we see notable evidence of clustering for certain
sectors, particularly in ﬁnance (pictured in red, once again channeling those
Maryland REITs identiﬁed above) and manufacturing (which manifests
several sub-sector clusters).189 This pattern is also consistent with Table 3,
where the ﬁnance sector was an outlier in all pertinent document metrics
(length, readability, TTR, and cosine similarity).
Figure 9: Governance Clustering by Industry (in two-dimensional space)

188 Cf. Jeﬀrey M. Gorris, Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Delaware Corporate
Law and the Model Business Corporation Act: A Study in Symbiosis, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107,
108 (2011) (“[T]here have been occasions on which [the MBCA’s] hallmark precision has impaired
its utility as a model, and its assertions of superiority have been overblown.”). In Online Appendix
E, we report several additional analyses that investigate this question from different angles. None
of these approaches provides any appreciable evidence that charters from two different
jurisdictions sharing an MBCA origin would be more similar to each other than charters that did
not share this origin.
189 In a separate set of robustness checks, we used a more general statistical test for whether
the clustering of charters of companies from the same industry that can be observed in Figure 9
could be explained as a result of chance. The results from this analysis indicate that this is not
the case. This result suggests that a firm’s corporate governance is at least partly a function of its
area of business.
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Although our focus thus far has been trained on the “mashup” versions of
company charters (blending all years of a company’s charter), the snapshot
versions of our corpus are also well situated to unlock interesting dynamic
clues about how governance evolves over time. The transformation of the
banking sector (a subset of the ﬁnance industry) during the Financial Crisis
provides an interesting example of this story.190 Figure 10 illustrates diagrams
similar to those above, but each is now separately generated for diﬀering
snapshot years (representing 2008, 2010, and 2012, respectively). Banks are
represented with red dots,191 while all other companies are in gray. In 2008,
the chartering contents of bank charters appeared far from homogenous, with
few (if any) clustering neighborhoods. By 2010, however, this pattern changed
dramatically, with a tight cluster of banks emerging—and this cluster clearly
persisted into 2012.
It does not take a rocket scientist (or rocket science attorney) to make an
educated guess as to why bank charters began clustering at this moment in
time. In October 2008, the United States government interceded at the height
of the ﬁnancial crisis, infusing Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds
into the coﬀers of dozens of large and medium-sized banks.192 These infusions
typically took the form of preferred equity purchases that gave the
government considerable shareholder rights—rights that were formally
recorded at some point in early 2009. Accordingly, insofar as they aﬀect the
text of corporate charters (as new share issues must), they largely show up in
the CCG on January 1, 2010 (depicted in the middle panel). Since the US
government was eﬀectively a large and powerful horizontal shareholder across
multiple banks, it is not surprising that TARP administrators used that power
in bargaining, so that the basic terms and conditions of the preferred share
issuances stayed relatively uniform. Indeed, many bank recipients of TARP
funds simply inserted a verbatim version of a standard provision into their
corporate charters, resulting in a discernible clustering of charters within this
industry.193 As the recipient banks progressively paid oﬀ their TARP
190 While governance studies no doubt feature prominently in the study of banking history,
we are not aware of work that uses computational analysis to accomplish the task. Cf. Charles W.
Calomiris & Mark Carlson, Corporate Governance and Risk Management at Unprotected Banks: National
Banks in the 1890s, 119 J. FIN. ECON. 512 (2016) (analyzing the impact of corporate governance
structure on banking policy and practice in the 1890s).
191 We treat as banks all companies for which Compustat reports the SIC code “60” (designated
as “Depository Institutions”).
192 Andrew Clark, Paulson Abandons Plans to Buy Up America’s Toxic Mortgage Assets, THE
GUARDIAN (Nov. 12, 2008, 7:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2008/nov/13/harrypaulson-banking-rescue-mortgage [https://perma.cc/5FRM-VA8H].
193 The dark red cluster in the middle and bottom panel of Figure 10 includes the following
ﬁrms: First Financial Bancorp; Firstmerit Corp; Suntrust Banks Inc; Old National Bancorp; First
Midwest Bancorp; Umpqua Holdings Corp; Valley National Bancorp; City National Corp; Whitney
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investments and left the program, this clustering pattern steadily began to
dissipate, and it had largely disappeared by 2018.
Figure 10: Transformation of Bank Governance During the Financial Crisis

Although computational text analysis is surely overkill for documenting
the banking sector’s well-known transformation during the Financial Crisis,
Holding Corp; National Penn Bankshares Inc; First Niagara Financial Group Inc; Cardinal
Financial Corp; Fulton Financial Corp; Marshall & Ilsley Corp; Taylor Capital Group Inc; Eagle
Bancorp Inc; Seacoast Banking Corp of Florida; Bank of the Ozarks Inc; Fidelity Southern Corp;
Wintrust Financial Corp; and American Express Co. According to ProPublica, all these banks at
one point received TARP money, and 18 of the 21 were among the ﬁrst beneﬁciaries of the
government’s equity purchase program in late 2008. See Bailout Tracker: Bailout Recipients,
PROPUBLICA, https://projects.propublica.org/bailout/list [https://perma.cc/ADU9-NJE9] (Feb. 16, 2021).
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it is comforting to see that a tool seemingly as blunt as document
vectorization (into two dimensions, no less) can still capture a notorious wave
of governance convergence. Perhaps more exciting is the use of these and
similar techniques to tease out other, less clear-cut evolutionary trajectories.
For example, there is now a growing and controversial literature positing a
provocative circumstantial argument suggesting that passive investing is
anticompetitive, since it results in large common/horizontal ownership in the
ownership blocks held by index funds across sectors.194 Several of the
combatants in this area have raised important questions about identifying the
causal mechanism (if any) that converts common ownership into oligopolistic
power (e.g., compensation, lobbying, intra-ﬁrm governance, etc.).195 A natural
way to test whether common ownership aﬀects governance might attempt to
measure if and to what extent the emergence of common or horizontal
ownership blocks also predicts patterns of convergence in the content of
governance documents (such as charters and bylaws).
C. Supervised Learning Tools
Our textual corpus and labels are not only interesting for their descriptive
applications: they also allow us to make some predictions. For example, as
companies continue to ﬁle charters over time, they add to the corpus, and we
can then use our labels to train a machine-learning classiﬁer to quickly label
the new ﬁlings. Doing so not only allows us to absorb the new additions into
our database more quickly, but it also facilitates error detection and correction
in all our existing labels (a task we have already implemented in part for this
Article). Moreover, future researchers will also be able to use our corpus to
generate new labels, indices, and evaluative metrics that are not currently part
of any major governance data collection enterprise, including features such as
forum selection provisions, board diversity provisions, stakeholder
provisions, and the like.
Although space limitations preclude us from demonstrating the full range
of the conceivable supervised learning applications, one that is directly
relevant to our analysis above concerns our evaluation of the G-Index and
194 See, e.g., David Gilo, The Anticompetitive Eﬀect of Passive Investment, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1
(2000) (arguing that passive investing may substantially lessen competition); Elhauge, supra note 18
(arguing that common ownership may anticompetitively raise prices); David Gilo, Yossi Moshe &
Yossi Spiegel, Partial Cross Ownership and Tacit Collusion, 37 RAND J. ECON. 81 (2006) (arguing that
when there is passive partial cross-ownership of ﬁrms, ﬁrms engage in “tacit collusion”); Posner et
al., supra note 18 (arguing that institutional investors, who own shares passively, may engage in
anticompetitive behavior); Yaron Nili, Horizontal Directors, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 1179 (2020)
(discussing the common ownership debate and the role common directors in the same industry may
play in enabling anticompetitive practices).
195 See sources cited supra notes 18–19.
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corrections thereto embodied in the CCG-Index. As discussed in Part I, the
components of the G-Index continue jointly and severally to be used by
corporate governance researchers to inform critical academic and policy
debates. Because those components are purportedly derived in large part
from governance documents themselves, our corpus (and labels) should bear
a natural relationship to them, eﬀectively allowing us to use the CCG
database to “predict” the G-Index score. Similarly, our corpus can also allow
us to predict the CCG-Index, giving us an indirect measure of the ﬁdelity of
each index to underlying governance documents and statutory structure.
Figure 11: ML Predictions of G-Index (Top) & CCG-Index (Bottom)196

196 Univariate OLS regression estimates of Predicted on Observed G-Index and CCG-Index
overlaid on each panel, respectively. Data points in the scatter plots are “jittered” for visualization purposes
due to stacking of observations around the regression lines. Significance: * = 0.05; **=0.01; ***=0.001.
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To explore these possibilities, we used each of the G-Index and CCGIndex to calibrate a machine learning classifier, generating predicted values
of each index based solely on the semantic content of our corpus of charters
and their associated labels. We took care to use identical, well-established
estimation techniques to calibrate each classifier.197 The performance of our
classifiers against their “target” index is depicted in the scatter-plot panels
of Figure 11, with the G-Index on top and the CCG-Index below. Our
calibrated classifier for the G-Index works reasonably well, successfully
predicting 45% of the variation in the index.198 In some respects, this result
bolsters one’s confidence that the G-Index reflects something about
company-level governance choices as manifested in the charter (as it
purports to do). By the same token, the classifier fails to predict the
remaining 55% of the variation in the G-Index. Based solely on this analysis,
one cannot tell how much of the prediction noise is due to (a) a limitation
on what such classifiers can offer, or (b) inaccurate labeling of the
underlying data used to formulate the G-Index.
The bottom panel uses the identical approach, but this time as applied to
the predicted and actual values of the CCG-Index. It is immediately clear
that this classiﬁer also has good predictive power. More than good, in fact: the
CCG-Index predictions are a much tighter ﬁt than those of the G-Index, and
the scatter-plot “cloud” is substantially more centered around our prediction
line. Indeed, calibrating to the CCG-Index substantially increases our
predictive power, from 44% to 68% of the variance in the respective indices. Put
another way, when compared to the G-Index predictions, our CCG-Index
predictions are more accurate by half, a result that is consistent with the

197 For the technically minded reader, we deployed lasso regressions on the principal
components of the vectorized texts to generate all predicted values. This approach counteracts overﬁtting risks by imposing a multiplicative penalty (λ>0) on the sum of the absolute value of estimated
coeﬃcients. It thus automatically shrinks the set of non-zero coeﬃcients, retaining only the most
explanatory ones. In our case, the penalty parameter (λ) was calibrated to minimize the sum of
squared residuals in a ten-fold cross-validation, and the resulting coeﬃcients were then used to
generate predicted values as described in the text. For more on this utterly scintillating technique,
see generally Robert Tibshirani, Regression Shrinkage and Selection via the Lasso, 58 J. ROYAL STAT.
SOC’Y: SERIES B (METHODOLOGICAL) 267 (1996).
198 We reiterate that all predicted values were generated on an “out-of-sample” basis using a
ten-fold cross-validation: the documents were split into ten arbitrary groups, and for each group
the model was calibrated using only the remaining nine partitions, rendering predictions for the
held-out group. Technically speaking, this tuning approach can still lead to overﬁtting, as we use the
cross-validation both to compute the parameters used for model tuning and to estimate the accuracy
of the estimates. However, we expect the extent of such overﬁtting to be insubstantial. See also
Jacques Wainer & Gavin Cawley, Nested Cross-Validation When Selecting Classiﬁers Is
Overzealous for Most Practical Applications (Sept. 25, 2018) (unpublished manuscript),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1809.09446.pdf [https://perma.cc/R55G-4L7N].
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conclusion that our corrections indeed remediated substantial coding errors
in the G-Index.199
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND THE ROAD AHEAD
For many readers, this Article may prove to be something of a Pandora’s
box: Most immediately, it problematizes several corporate governance “folk
wisdoms” that have long been considered settled—including a result so
beatiﬁed in the literature that it has achieved slogan status: that good
governance translates into good returns. Using a deliberately conservative
error-correction protocol, we demonstrated not only that the ﬁeld’s standard
metrics for good governance appear grossly inaccurate, but also that the
connection between governance and investment returns is materially
sketchier than previously thought. Governance may yet matter, but the case
for it far less clear than we thought it was.200
We still do not know the full implications of the errors our analysis has
begun to uncover. Hundreds of studies have incorporated GIM’s results or
made use of the same questionable data. The various competitor indices are
notable examples,201 but there are scores of others that use the data or indices
as inputs or controls in their own empirical designs.202 Regulators, too, have
turned to GIM and its progeny to support a litany of governance reforms.203
Even critics of governance indices have largely presumed that the underlying
data are accurate.204 As a result, errors in popular governance datasets have
plausibly propagated throughout much of the corporate governance universe,
aﬀecting law, policy, practice, and theory. Reexamining the robustness of
199 Because the CCG-Index corrections were themselves based on a direct labeling of the raw
corpus, the alert reader might wonder whether a trained classifier would fare better for purely
mechanical reasons in predicting the CCG-Index. We discount this concern on both conceptual
and statistical grounds. First, the above approach constitutes a reasonable way to ascertain the
reliability of our labeling protocols (described at length in Appendix B) against those used to
assemble the IRRC (described nowhere). The G-Index is purportedly based on the same
documents and statutory structures as is our CCG-Index, and thus if the IRRC were labeled
correctly to begin with, our scatter plots would manifest trivial differences in predictive power
(rather than a nearly 25-percentage-point difference in R2). Second, in a separate robustness check
(see Online Appendix F), we stripped out our labels completely, training the text classifiers solely
with the raw textual content of corporate charters. While both predictors degrade, the same
qualitative result still holds: our classifier explains substantially more variation in the CCG-Index
(48.1%) than it does in the G-Index (36.7%).
200 Moreover, any more aggressive correction to data errors—including the addition of bylaw
data and expanded ﬁrm-level matching—might well cause further attenuation.
201 See generally Bebchuk et al., What Matters, supra note 11; Madanoglu & Karadag, supra note
45; Karpoﬀ et al., supra note 11.
202 See supra notes 45–54 and accompanying text.
203 See supra notes 56–60 and accompanying text.
204 See supra note 54.
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these results with more accurate data is a monumental undertaking that can
only feasibly be spread across many years and several researchers.
Our Pandora’s box also renders two ominous caveats about the critical
importance of data availability and the vital role of lawyers in legal
empiricism. As to the former, there is signiﬁcant corporate governance data
out there and free for the taking, but accessing it in usable form is fraught
with diﬃculty. Simply put, the task of ﬁnding, harvesting, and cleaning
fundamental governance documents for thousands of companies over three
decades is hard work. The most amenable source—the SEC’s quirky EDGAR
online ﬁling system—is cumbersome and poorly organized (especially for this
task). State regulators are even less helpful, often requiring travel to a
physical repository, only to face antiquated extraction technologies and
exorbitant access fees. The small number of third-party commercial
purveyors also charge fees, throttle downloading activity, and zealously
protect their investments with litigation threats. Even for us—motivated
though we were—pulling oﬀ this enterprise literally required a worldwide
pandemic in the summer of 2020, which destabilized the economy and
unexpectedly made available dozens of highly qualiﬁed research assistants.205
It is diﬃcult to understand why public access to public records should be
so tough.206 The end result has been to make comprehensive governance
research accessible only to the most well-heeled, well-connected, and
patient—an observation that itself sounds a dissonant note about the uneven
intellectual and economic playing ﬁeld. Until now, the rest of us hoi polloi have
been largely left to make do with the same small number of commercial
resources, whose reliability has always been a little suspect, and which we
have now shown to be hamstrung with inaccuracies.207
The second systemic caveat from our analysis concerns the surprisingly
critical role of lawyers in empirical research. Although we cannot know for
sure, our results strongly suggest that whoever originally labeled the dominant
extant corporate governance databases had limited (if any) legal training. Our
educated guess is that much of it was coded by non-lawyers. This approach—
while no doubt economical—has a significant and unfortunate shortcoming:
As we have shown above, turning corporate governance texts into quantitative
See infra Appendix A.
Corporate governance documents are only one example of such hurdles. See, e.g., Pah et al.,
supra note 24, at 134-36 (chronicling restrictions of the PACER system over federal judicial records).
207 As noted above, commercial data providers provide two types of data: data scraped from
the SEC, and independently gathered and coded data with little to no information about the
gathering and coding process (the IRRC and ISS datasets). See supra Part I. The former imports
whatever inaccuracies were in the SEC data onto a new platform, while layering on a theoretically
easier-to-use search function. But while these search functions improve upon the SEC’s, they
invariably miss important bits of information, which makes data gathered through these types of
databases almost certainly incomplete.
205
206
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data is a big ask. It requires nuanced domain knowledge, legal judgment, and
familiarity with broader principles of law and regulation. Nonlawyers, almost
by definition, possess few of these skills.
And therein lies the rub: lawyers, a professional class deﬁned largely by a
common aversion to numbers, appear long ago to have surrendered the
project of corporate governance data collection to others. This was a mistake.
In our opinion, the time is long past for lawyers to shed our quantitative
heebeegeebees, roll up our sleeves, and reclaim the ﬁeld of corporate
governance research (including the data bit).
While our Pandora’s box unleashes some admittedly negative mojo, it also
contains a substantial beacon of hope. The versatility and open-source
accessibility of the CCG database holds considerable promise for unlocking
future chapters of corporate governance discourse along multiple dimensions.
For example, recent years have seen a burgeoning attention to the societal
role of corporations, the role for non-shareholder constituencies in corporate
governance, and the alternatives to a shareholder primacy view of corporate
law. A common rejoinder to the stakeholderism movement is cost: that
stakeholderism chases marginal or unproven beneﬁts while sacriﬁcing the
returns that shareholder primacy is widely known to create.208 If such widely
known folk wisdoms are, in fact, the vestiges of inaccurate data (as we have
argued), then this cost-based rejoinder packs a considerably punier punch.
More generally, when armed with our open-source resource, empirically
minded corporate governance researchers will be far better equipped to
explore both conventional and emergent corporate governance questions.
Even more promising is the potential for the CCG to transform
fundamentally the way we “do” corporate governance research writ large. Our
corpus is a critical ingredient for harnessing novel techniques from
computational text analysis and machine learning, and then applying them to
our understanding of how ﬁrms are organized. Already, machine learning is
fueling exciting results in many legal domains209—and we believe that
corporate governance is an especially availing (yet still relatively untapped)
target. Marshaling these new techniques to complement more traditional
methodologies can lead to better empirical understanding, better theory, and

208 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel & Roberto Tallarita, For Whom Corporate Leaders
Bargain, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 7), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3677155 [https://perma.cc/32P7-GHVZ] (“Our ﬁndings thus casts doubt on
whether stakeholderism should be expected to deliver its purported beneﬁts for stakeholders.”);
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance, 106 CORNELL
L. REV. 91, 94 (2020) (“[S]takeholderism is an ineﬀective and indeed counterproductive approach
to protecting stakeholders . . . .”).
209 See sources cited supra note 16.
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better policy. Our discussion above merely scratches the surface of what can
be accomplished with these techniques.
Almost as important is the fact that the CCG is eﬀectively future-proof.
While the most popular corporate governance datasets today consist solely of
(questionable) data labels, we provide the underlying textual inputs
themselves—the very DNA of corporate governance. This raw textual corpus
will empower future researchers to expand the breadth of existing labeled
datasets, to correct mistakes in existing ones (including ours), and to devise
novel analytic measures to take on as-yet-unknown questions. The
possibilities are endless, and the potential for intellectual payoﬀ appreciable.
With the CCG database, moreover, we all will have a running start.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have unveiled the fruits of a multi-year eﬀort to harvest,
clean, organize, and make publicly available (for the ﬁrst time) a corpus of
foundational corporate governance documents spanning three decades and
thousands of public companies. We have demonstrated the immediate value
of this resource by combining it with carefully hand-labeled data, which we
then used to uncover a disconcerting pattern of errors within the most widely
used corporate governance datasets among researchers. And those
inaccuracies are consequential: Even after imposing a deliberately
conservative error correction protocol, we have shown that some of the most
well-known metrics and empirical insights in the ﬁeld stand on shaky ground.
In the light of these ﬁndings, one might reasonably ask whether we should
reassess our claim—made at the onset of this article—that empirical corporate
governance is a major success story in the interdisciplinary study of law.210 In
our view, no such reappraisal is warranted. To the contrary: notwithstanding
the appreciable inﬁrmity of existing data that we have unearthed, as well as
the corresponding state of ﬂux it visits upon well-known folk wisdoms of the
ﬁeld, we view our project as ultimately standing on the shoulders of those
early eﬀorts. Those contributions permanently changed the conversation
about how to understand corporate governance on a broad scale. In bringing
this new resource into the public domain, our ultimate goal (and our
accomplishment) is to lay the foundation for advancing the empirical
corporate governance project even further. By providing a clean, accessible,
primary data source going to the very structure of corporate governance, our
project helps to provide a critical resource for unleashing new tools from
machine learning and text analysis, taking corporate governance research into
its next chapter.
210

See supra notes 7–10 and accompanying text.

2021]

Cleaning Corporate Governance

65

And yet, much of the current chapter is still being written. Although our
contribution makes a marked improvement over the status quo, we are neither
so prideful nor so delusional to believe our oﬀering cannot be improved upon.
Though relatively comprehensive, our corpus does not include all companies
or all conceivable measurement years. It is likely that we have missed at least
some relevant texts even for those issuers we track. And, notwithstanding our
collaborative judgments as legal scholars, others will quibble with our calls
about how to label certain elements of the corpus. All that said, the opensource nature of the CCG transforms each of these bugs into features: we
invite all corporate governance researchers, professional or academic, expert
or dilettante, U.S.-based or foreign, quant or poet, to contribute to this
resource, helping each other collectively to cultivate it further.211
We also anticipate that the scope of our own task will expand. As
monumental as the present undertaking has proven, our efforts have tackled
only select (albeit important) pieces of the corporate governance ecosystem.
In ongoing work, we have already begun to take on other foundational
governance domains, including bylaws, shareholder agreements, board
resolutions, and the like. Each presents an opportunity to correct past
mistakes, to deploy new computational tools, to push the boundaries of
knowledge, and (most fundamentally) to clean corporate governance for good.

211 We have enabled interested researchers to make use of the corpus and to develop
improvements to the CCG database, transforming it into a living resource. The use and adaptation
of the corpus is free of charge and subject to the Creative Commons Share-Alike License (v. 4.0).
See Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International, CREATIVE COMMONS, https://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode [https://perma.cc/QPX9-TCVA].

66

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 170: 1

APPENDICES212
APPENDIX A: RESEARCH ASSISTANT ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
An undertaking of this magnitude necessarily involved a phalanx of
research assistants, from law school graduates, to current law students, to
undergraduates. Rather than hiding their names in a starred footnote, we use
this Appendix to acknowledge their contributions. We are deeply indebted to
them for their dedication and service.
Senior Research Assistants213
Nicole Banton
Sean Michael Blochberger
Matthew Cunningham
Deandra Fike
Channing Gatewood
Katie Gresham
Qifan Huang
Elisha Jones
Sami Kattan
Gabrielle Kiefer
Andrew Kim
Adam Mazin
Cameron Molis

Courtney Murray
Doriane S. Nguenang Tchenga
Sneha Pandya
Emily Park
Madison Roemer
Olivia Roat
Bhargav Setlur
Tom St. Henry
Avi Weiss
Gretchen Winkel
Geoﬀrey Xiao
Ben Zonenshayn

Research Assistants214
Nathaniel Barrett
Amanda Cooper
Elif Nazli Hamutcu
Alex Inskeep
Justen Joﬀe
Alexa Levy
Annabelle Liu

212
213
214

Noam Miller
Emily Moini
Stephen Rothman
Adrien Stein
Max Swan
Agnes Tran

Appendices C, D, E and F are available at www.publiccompanycharters.com.
Senior Research assistants were JD students or recent JD graduates at top law schools.
Research Assistants were undergraduate students at eight top universities.

2021]

Cleaning Corporate Governance

67

APPENDIX B: DATA COLLECTION AND CLEANING PROTOCOLS
This Appendix provides further details about our process for building the
panel-structured chartering corpus for the CCG database, as well as our
labeling protocols. We subdivided our description into (1) locating charters; (2)
text extraction; (3) charter content labeling; and (4) state law content labeling.
Locating Charters (Task 1)
Our dataset consists of all charters available on EDGAR for all companies
that fulﬁll at least one of the two following alternative criteria.
• The company was part of the S&P 1500 in any year between 2010
and 2019.
• The company is in the IRRC database for at least three out of the
following five years of coverage in the IRRC: 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004,
and 2006.215
For any issuer satisfying at least one of these inclusion criteria, we
attempted to extract the most complete chartering history available (even for
years not satisfying the above criteria). Applying these criteria, we compiled
a list of 2,899 companies. For all companies in our dataset, we obtained all of
their current and historical charters available on EDGAR, and extracted,
cleaned and organized their text.
To ensure accuracy in our collection and avoid the pitfalls of some of the
current commercial data, we tackled this challenge manually, with the help of
a large number of research assistants. Our protocol for locating relevant texts
leveraged the requirement for companies to include information about their
corporate charters with their annual 10-K ﬁling.216 These ﬁlings usually do
not contain the text of the charter themselves, but instead incorporate the
charter by reference to one or more prior ﬁlings, typically ﬁled shortly after
the charter was adopted/amended. Our harvesting protocol therefore
followed a sequential process: (1) locate the company’s most recent annual 10K ﬁling; (2) determine whether the ﬁling reproduces a full charter
restatement or merely incorporates one by reference; and (3) if no full
215 The ISS Legacy/IRRC database does not cover all years, but instead it observes S&P 1500
issuers periodically, in 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006. EDGAR ﬁlings were
voluntary in 1995, and they did not become compulsory until May 1996. For a history of EDGAR’s
roll-out, see History of EDGAR, supra note 104. Our data collection effort required at least three
years of IRRC coverage to focus on issuers that could generate a reasonably reliable panel structure,
and we omitted from our search the first three years of the IRRC’s coverage (1990, 1993, 1995)
since those years pre-dated the full roll-out of the SEC’s EDGAR service (our primary data
collection source).
216 15 U.S.C. § 78m.
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restatement is found, use the exhibit references to identify the dates and
locations of prior ﬁlings that contain the full text of the current charter as
well as any intervening amendments.217 Once those new texts were located
and added to our database, the search protocol repeated, with the next
iteration starting with the 10-K ﬁling that immediately precedes the ﬁling
date of the full restated charter located from the prior iteration. For each
issuer, we looped through these sequential steps repeatedly, working
backwards in time until the trail ran cold and no more responsive documents
could be located on EDGAR.218 We spot-checked several companies’ charters
against inventory lists from commercial providers to conﬁrm that our manual
collection eﬀorts avoided the aforementioned coverage gaps that befall
commercial providers (they substantially do).
Work on this part of the project started in October 2019; overlapping
cohorts of research assistants and law students assisted us in different
periods of time, but we were fortunate enough to bridge the transition
periods with high-quality legacy personnel to help train the next group.
We harvested most of the chartering histories for companies in the current
S&P 1500 in October and November 2019. Information obtained by
research assistants during this phase of the project was later verified by a
different set of research assistants—all assignments that were not
completed by either senior RAs or the coauthors underwent this procedure.
Information for companies that were not part of the S&P 1500 at the time
of the start of the project was assembled starting in the summer of 2020.
In this part of the project, we assigned the majority of companies to two
research assistants at the same time. In case the information provided by
the research assistants was not identical, we sent the information to a third
research assistant for verification.
Text Extraction (Task 2)
In a second step, we use the information obtained from Task 1 to extract
the texts of charters from EDGAR. For this, we employed a custom-made
python script. This process allowed us to gather charter texts for around 80%
of the charters we identify in Task 1. For the remaining 20%, research
assistants retrieved the text manually.

217 The recorded information also included helpful document text tags, which allowed us to
develop a customized computer program to extract the charter texts. In cases where this automated
text extraction failed, we extracted the text manually.
218 As a result, our strategy materially diﬀers from (and is more robust than) the approach
apparently used by most commercial services. See supra Part I.
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Charter Content Labeling (Task 3)
The third step involved labeling the contents of charters according to a
prespeciﬁed coding rubric. Our rubric contains a set of 28 questions about
the presence of speciﬁc provisions in a charter. Ten questions deal with issues
regarding the rights associated with diﬀerent classes of stock and the power
of the board to shift the balance of power among shareholders, in particular
in the context of takeover defenses. Another ten questions concern issues of
corporate governance (such as special meetings and written consents). A ﬁnal
set of questions concerns the liability of managers and corporate oﬃcers. For
each of these questions, we asked coders to provide us not just with a binary
response if the provision was present, but also with relevant text if they are
able to locate a provision in the charter.
We implemented this rubric in an Excel spreadsheet that allowed us to code
the contents of charters for the same company on one sheet. We also made
available to coders “redline” documents that show the changes between
different versions of (full restatements of) corporate charters. Our research
assistant team convened once per week via Zoom to discuss the labeling process
and to tackle any issues that occurred during the previous week. We also set up
an online forum where coders had the opportunity to ask questions on an
ongoing basis, and that was consistently monitored by one of the senior RAs.
Initially, we assigned the same company to multiple coders in order to track
agreement rates and identify the need for additional training. After that, we
assigned companies to two research assistants at the same time. Senior
research assistants reviewed all questions for which the coders’ answers
diverged. During this phase of the project, we also tracked rates of agreements
between coders. After some weeks, we ceased double-assigning companies to
JD research assistants. For other research assistants whose coding appeared
particularly reliable, we also incrementally reduced the amount of overlap with
other coders. However, we made sure that at least 33% of the companies coded
by undergrad coders were double-assigned. Overall, we labeled the contents
of all the charters for 1,573 issuers in our dataset. The companies included in
Task 3 were chosen as follows. Because one of the goals of our manual coding
was to replicate studies relying on the IRRC database, we deviated from
random assignment in one important way: whenever possible, we gave priority
to companies that were included in the IRRC database.
State Law Content Labeling (Task 4)
In a separate eﬀort, we trained business law students to label a panel data
set of laws from all ﬁfty states and the District of Columbia regarding sixteen
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governance-related issues.219 (Several of these dimensions appear to have
been wrongly neglected in notable databases like the IRRC.)
For state law, labelers tabulated the existence and substantive directionality
of the provision (e.g., “required” or “not required/silent”), whether it was a
default or immutable rule, the lowest echelon of corporate governance
document capable of contracting out of the rule (if it was default), and
limitations/constraints placed on available choices for issuers opting out (again
if it was a default). These criteria were then employed to implement the
“conservative” approach to identifying and correcting errors. Our state-level
panel data also include labels for four additional state law provisions that we
extracted from preexisting assorted sources in the literature.220 Although we
did not label these de novo, when the designations in the literature conflicted
with one another we did primary research to reconcile the differences.

For additional details, see Online Appendices.
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